

German Sociology

BY

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Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree
of Doctor of Philosophy, in the Faculty of Political
Science, Columbia University

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German Sociology

INTRODUCTION.

Scientists have tended to group themselves in two distinctive ways, first about the central idea of the science which they represent, and secondly about some special element in their respective fields of study, which gives to their own work a more or less national character. From the soothsayers, the astrologers and the "wise men" of antiquity, gathering themselves together in small national groups, to the modern French, German, English, Italian or American schools of the various sciences, the tendency has been one and the same. It is not surprising then, that in the newest of the social sciences, sociology, there should be manifest certain peculiar characteristics, by which we may be able to group its exponents into more or less distinct national schools.

The comparatively recent rise of sociology into scientific prominence accounts in part for the fact that the national lines are not yet very sharply drawn. Still we may, with a certain degree of definiteness, speak of an Italian School of Sociologists, for instance, centering about the activities of Lombroso, Ferri, Vaccaro or Mantia; of a French School, represented with some degree of diversity by such men as Tarde, Durkheim, Le Bon, or Worms; of an English school, whose work is manifest in the writings of Darwin, Spencer, Pearson, Galton, Jevons, Bagehot and Bryce; of an American School, represented by Giddings, Small, Ward, Ross, Carver and others. And finally, we may with some qualification, speak of a German School of Sociologists, whose most prominent representatives we note in Schaeffle, Gumpłowicz, Ratzenhofer, Simmel, Barth, Stein and Tönnies.

In fact "Die Deutsche Gesellschaft für Soziologie" was formed in Berlin on January 3, 1909, embracing in its membership repre-

sentatives from many of the German universities, and allying with itself the Swiss and the Austrian sociological societies. Throughout this study we shall consider as German sociologists, however, not only those who are natives of Germany itself, but also those in Austria, Switzerland and even Russia, who write regularly for the German public. This is a study of German sociology, not of sociology in Germany.

But German sociology has always been, and is still confounded with so many other sciences, that it has with difficulty gathered its representatives together into any sort of coherent group. Indeed, much of German sociology may be called to-day as it was designated by O. Thon in 1896, either "an importation,"¹ or else an adaptation of some other field of social science to pure sociological thinking. In 1898 Thomas Achelis, writing a popular article, discusses the position of sociology with the following biting sarcasm: "The newer sociology, which in connection with natural science, on the one hand, and historical discipline on the other, has made itself felt in the last decade, begins gradually to gain an entrance among us, we who suffer because of a certain academic 'wigdom' (*Verzöpfung*) and an official anachronism. It is indeed a significant sign of the times that in Berlin a chair of statistics is being considered. France, England, America, Austria, and even Russia are ahead of us in this regard, that is, as to what the general interest and understanding of the sociological problem demands."² The situation was also well outlined by Ratzenhofer, in 1904, when he said: "One must, like myself, live in the atmosphere dominated by the traditions of learned Germany in order to have an idea of the bitter struggle which the special sciences have waged against sociology. Nevertheless, this struggle, in spite of the outbreaks of hatred toward the founders of sociology, as, for example, Gumpłowicz, has already turned in their favor. The book market is swamped with bulky works which try to assume the appearance of sociological intelligence, and the designation, "Sociology," is applied to the most incongruous fields of thought."³

¹ Amer. Jour. Sociol., II: 567.

² "Eine Geschichte der Sklaverei," *Die Zeit*, Jan. 1, 1898, p. 3. For full information concerning German periodicals, see Bibliography.

³ "The Problems of Sociology," Amer. Jour. Sociol., Sept., 1904, p. 177.

It is therefore necessary to notice a few of the men who represent German sociology in a preliminary sketch, characterizing them briefly, and reserving more extensive criticism for later discussion.

Not even his bitterest opponent would deny to Albert Schaeffle the foremost place in the influence he has exerted on sociological study in Germany. His "*Bau und Leben des Socialen Körpers*," appearing in its first edition in 1875, was for years¹ the leading and most comprehensive sociology in the German Language. Through this work and in his frequent writings in "*Die Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft*," Schaeffle has done much to give sociology the scientific place it is now attaining in German thought.²

Related somewhat in theory to Schaeffle, and often erroneously confused with him, is Paul von Lilienfeld, the famous Russian Sociologist, whose "*Gedanken über eine Socialwissenschaft der Zukunft*" appeared about the same time as Schaeffle's first work.³ Probably the length of Lilienfeld's work, six volumes, together with its somewhat obscure phraseology and extreme point of view, tended to prevent his writings from exerting a marked influence on German Sociology until a more recent date, after he had revised and shortened his work into a more readable and acceptable form.⁴

In spite of the dogmatic dress in which his writing is clothed, the sociology of Ludwig Gumplowicz has been of great value, both to German thought, and to sociology in general. His "*Rechtsstaat und Socialismus*," 1881; "*Der Rassenkampf*," 1883, and "*Grundriss der Soziologie*," 1885, presented for the

¹ Although Lilienfeld's work appeared in the meantime, little or no additional sociology was written in German until Gumplowicz began to write in the early eighties.

² Schaeffle's "*Bau und Leben*" was revised in a second edition of two volumes in 1896. A posthumous volume, entitled "*Abriss der Soziologie von Albert Schaeffle*," edited by his colleague, Karl Bücher, appeared in 1908, and gives a fair and briefer presentation of Schaeffle's sociology.

³ The first of Lilienfeld's six volumes appeared in 1873, but his work did not become known generally until some time after Schaeffle's book.

⁴ *Zur Verteidigung der organischen Methode in der Soziologie*. For full information concerning books cited, see Bibliography.

first time in German thought a clear inductive study of sociology, as a distinct and special social science. The constant insistence of Gumpłowicz since the appearance of his first book up to the present day, that sociology is a science in the truest sense of the word, and, as such, has a special field of research, has done much to divorce the infant study from its many social attachments in German thought.

Chronologically, Ferdinand Tönnies deserves the next place in our sketch, although his contribution to the trend of sociological thinking in Germany has hardly been as great as that of some later writers. Tönnies' most significant work, from which he has changed little in later years, is "*Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft*."¹ The most distinctive feature of Tönnies' view, which has influenced later sociological writing, is his emphasis on the psychological activity of the will, both individual and social.

Nearly contemporary with Tönnies, but more influential upon sociology in Germany, is Georg Simmel. His first distinctively sociological work, "*Über sociale Differenzierung*,"² emphasized the fact which Tönnies had then but partially conceived, that a large part of the social process is psychological. In fact, according to Simmel, the whole process is such. This emphasis, combined with the minute analyses of social groups in his latter works,³ have placed Simmel in the foremost rank of living German sociologists.

The place of Gustav Ratzenhofer in German sociology is without doubt smaller than it ought to be, owing to his pronounced and repeatedly emphasized positivism. Still the influence of this writer, like that of his colleague, Gumpłowicz, in ridding sociology from its useless encumbrances, and in making for it a distinct place as a science, has been very great. His writings date from 1893, and present in a brief, yet comprehensive form, one of the first systems of pure sociology in the German language.⁴

¹ Leipzig, 1887.

² Leipzig, 1890.

³ Cf., "*Soziologie*," Leipzig, 1908, and writings in the *American Journal of Sociology*.

⁴ Cf. "*Wesen und Zweck der Politik*," 1893; "*Die sociologische Erkenntniss*," 1898; "*Soziologie*," 1907.

In 1897 there appeared in Germany two books, covering for the most part the same field, but each from a different point of view. These two books were Paul Barth's "*Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Sociologie*" and Ludwig Stein's "*Die Sociale Frage im Lichte der Philosophie*." Barth attempts to give a history of sociological thought for the purpose of showing that philosophy of history and sociology are one and the same thing. Stein gives a compendium of almost every writer from Plato to modern times, who has treated not only of sociological, but also of social questions, for the purpose of showing that sociology is only a more fitting designation for social philosophy.¹ The large amount of discussion and criticism which the books of these two men have called forth has done much to clear away the fogs that threatened for a time to extinguish the sociological fires in Germany, and have given an entirely new stimulus to the study.

Apart from these men, who may be classed, with some individual qualifications, as sociologists, German sociology has been influenced in no small measure by writers in other scientific fields. Schmoller, von Baerenbach, Bücher, Ammon, Ratzel, Lippert, Lipps, Nietzsche, Stammler, Nordenholz, Vierkandt, Steinmetz, Zenker and others of more or less prominence, have added contributions, which are helping to relate sociology to the special sciences, where such relation is needed, and to distinguish it where distinction is required.

But more than by the personal influence of any or all of the writers we have mentioned, German sociology has been moulded by the related fields of social science. Sociology has been studied by the Germans through other sciences rather than independently. This fact applies even to some of the writers we have spoken of, for each of them came to sociology from some other field of social research, and in some cases this former specialty still remains an abiding part of the sociology of the author.²

The fact that Germany was one of the last countries to accept sociology as a science,³ is in itself a reason why it has been neces-

¹ Cf. p. 14,

² Cf. Barth, Gumpłowicz, Schaeffle.

³ By some scholars it is still tabooed.

sary that such a large number of varied influences were needed to turn the German from his former views. Steeped in the Kantian and Hegelian philosophy of the early part of the nineteenth century, the German scholars have found it a difficult task to re-arrange their scientific classifications and categories in such a manner that they might admit sociology to the rank of an independent science. Dr. O. Thon, of Berlin, writing, in 1896, in the *American Journal of Sociology*,¹ says: "Official recognition is so far refused that in Professor Conrad's 'Staatswörterbuch,' the article 'Sociology' is entirely lacking".² Stein, in 1898, said of German sociology, "Germany, the home of the philosophy of history and of the history of philosophy, opposed the entrance of sociological literature in every way. Even Spencer's *Sociology* found entrance with great difficulty, in spite of the excellent German translation by Vetter and Marguardsen. And even where the opposition, intensified by Dilthey against sociology, had been overcome, the enthusiasm on the German side was very moderate, and dampened down to zero temperature."³ August Stadler (Zurich), writing in the "*Archiv für systematische Philosophie*," in 1896,⁴ on the question "*Zur Klassifikation der Wissenschaften*," does not even mention sociology in his tabulation of the sciences, nor in his discussion of them. He evidently felt that his definition of a science as "the most exact description possible of an entirety of ideas," could hardly apply to so inexact a science as sociology was at that time in Germany.

It is, therefore, of importance to notice some of the influences, and to consider some of the changes in German thought, which have to-day made it possible for a union of German sociologists to be formed, and which are rapidly bringing into more favorable relations the sociologists and the opponents of sociology among the German thinkers. While it might be possible to find in the political, the industrial or the social changes of Germany during the last ten years some reasons that have tended to bring about

¹ II, 567, 718, 792, "The Present Status of Sociology in Germany."

² P, 567.

³ "Die Sociale Frage," 19.

⁴ II: 1 sq.

a more favorable consideration of sociology, and which have actually afforded a stimulus to sociological research, we pass over these, and consider mainly some of the changes in the related scientific fields that have occasioned this result.

Of the many influences that have tended up to the present time to mould German sociology, few have been more significant than the numerous and diverse economic studies of the German scholars. We need mention only such names as those of Schaeffle, Bücher, Oppenheimer, Schmoller, Dietzel and Nordenholz, as representative of the large number of writers who have entered into the domain of sociology through the gateway of economics. The fact that economic interests in Germany have received the greatest amount of consideration from social scientists since the revolution of 1848, is in no small measure the reason for the transferring of these studies to sociology. The work of Lorenz von Stein, Mohl and Gneist, in the middle of the last century, and that of Bluntschli a little later, all laying emphasis on economics and on political affairs relating to that subject, were fruitful for years in the sociological writings of Germans, and have not yet lost their influence entirely.

Growing out of these economic studies, on the one hand, and on the other, the cause of them, was the great socialistic movement in Germany, which, with its many ramifications, now touches in some ways almost every field of social science. It is not surprising, then, that socialism should be influential upon the growing science of sociology. For the most part, socialists in Germany have looked askance at the sociologists. There seems, however, to have been little of the popular confusion of the two classes, as has been the case unfortunately in America. The sociologists in Germany, too, have not been backward in thundering against socialism. Simmel, Ratzenhofer, Schaeffle, Gumpowicz and others have used all the force of their logic to refute the Marxian tenets, and to destroy the basis of state socialism. On the other hand, such men as Ludwig Stein, Sombart and also Tönnies lean strongly toward, or even defend, the doctrines of socialism. One thing is certain, however, that socialism has served as an extremely strong stimulus to sociological analyses of society by the German writers.

One peculiar characteristic of German thought is to relate each field of science to history as the touchstone by which its value and genuineness is to be proved, and as the *sine qua non*, imperative for its very existence. The philosophy of history has permeated German thought to such a degree that the majority of scholars find in it the basis of every other science, particularly the social sciences. Sociology, too, has come under the influence of the extended historical studies of the Germans. One needs only to compare the exhaustive treatments of Ludwig Stein or Barth, above referred to, or the works of Julius Lippert, Spann or even Ratzel, to note the great influence of historical research upon German sociology. In fact, this passion of the German for philosophizing about history has even been detrimental to sociology, in that, it has tended in some cases to detract from the latter science and to add to the former. Wilhelm Dilthey, in his "Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften,"¹ attempts to prove both the impossibility of a philosophy of history and sociology, though in reality he does give a considerable basis for sociological study.

Ethnology in Germany came to birth in the middle of the last century, particularly under the influence of Adolph Bastian,² who has been called the "Father of Ethnology,"³ and somewhat later through Bachofen's long tabooed work, "Das Mutterrecht."⁴ The work of Gumpłowicz, Lippert, Westermaarck, Wundt, Stammler, and more recently, Steinmetz, has tended to bring into sociology the wealth of material gathered on ethnological fields, and to definitely relate the two sciences in German thought.

The influence of what Barth calls "the Anthro-po-geographical conception of history,"⁵ as exerted most markedly by F. Ratzel,⁶

¹ "Versuch einer Grundlegung für das Studium der Gesellschaft und der Geschichte;" cf. also "Berichte der Berliner Akademie der Wissenschaften," Dec., 1894, for Dilthey's paper on "Ideen über eine beschreibende und zergliedernde Psychologie."

² Der Mensch in der Geschichte, Leipzig, 1860.

³ Cf. Achelis "Soziologie," 1899, p. 38.

⁴ 1860. ⁵ Philos. der Gesch.

⁶ Anthropogeographie, oder Grundzüge der Anwendung der Erdkunde auf die Geschichte, 1882 u. 1891.

has tended to give to German sociology a sane recognition of the physical influence of environment upon the group, racial or national characteristics of a people.

Ever since Comte posited a science of sociology, and took as a fundamental basis the supposition that society is an organic unity, sociologists have been prone to follow up the work of the illustrious Positivist. But owing to the comparative lack of knowledge of biological processes, up to the middle or the last half of the nineteenth century, little or no special work by way of demonstrating society as an organism had been done. J. K. Bluntschli, following Lorenz v. Stein, had indeed stated in clear terms that the state is an organic unity, an "organism, in the sense that it has a spirit and body," but for lack of biological data, he could not press his analogy very far.¹ The practically simultaneous studies of Spencer, Schaeffle and Lilienfeld, however, emphasized with ascending degrees of precision, that society is a unity and that as such it bears marked analogies to the human organism. This search for the connecting links between the social and the individual organism has been a great stimulus to German sociology. Whatever one may think of the aptness with which the multifarious analogies may be applied, he must admit, nevertheless, that this method of approach has led many of the German scholars to a correct appreciation of the value of sociology as a science. Even Stein, in his attack on the organic method,² admits that the influence of the method of biological analogies has been of great service, and even now has its uses.³ From the psychological organism of Barth to the crass physical social organism of Lilienfeld, there is a wide chasm to be bridged; but the undoubted influence of the stimulus afforded by this method of sociological analysis is beyond dispute.

With hardly so pronounced an influence, yet with considerable sway, biology has made itself felt in another direction on the sociological field, viz., through the natural selectionists' school, as represented in Germany particularly by Ammon, Schallmayer

¹ Cf. "The Theory of the State," p. 19, sq.

² "Wesen und Aufgabe der Sociologie, Eine Kritik der organischen Methode in der Sociologie."

³ P. 38.

and Hansen. Following the lines of approach laid down by Darwin, and later by Francis Galton, and more recently still by Karl Pearson, the German representatives of this line of study, have helped the students of sociology to a more comprehensive realization of social evolution, particularly as manifested in individual types. This method of attack on sociological problems, together with its related statistical studies, is beginning to be felt in many of the German writings on these topics.

Just as the German usually seeks a historical basis for his theories, so he also wants a philosophical foundation upon which he may speculate, or reason. This is particularly evident in German sociological writings. Many of our American or English sociologists, and most of the modern French sociologists, do not emphasize the philosophical basis of their theories at all; and although they have such a basis, the reader is left to infer it. The Germans, however, seem to emphasize this characteristic of their sociological theories. Stein, with his insistence that sociology is a social philosophy; Lipps, with his metaphysical speculations about the fundamental characteristics of society; Gumpłowicz and Ratzenhofer, with their emphasis on the fact that Monism is the only true basis of sociology—these may be cited as examples of the tendency we have just noted.

The recent rise of Positivism in Germany has given a great impetus to sociological study. The placing of social science upon an empirical basis, and the ridding it of its load of mystical and metaphysical hypotheses, has done as much in Germany as any other single influence to make sociology acceptable to the scientific thinkers of to-day. Not that all sociologists are positivists in the same degree as Ratzenhofer is, but the emphasis upon the fact that society may be observed through the means of scientifically acceptable criteria—this has been the great service of monistic and positivistic philosophy to sociology.

We have given in a cursory way a few of the leading influences that have been effective in moulding German sociology, and in turning the attention of German scholars to sociological methods of thought. We do not pretend to have given an exhaustive list. This would entail a psychological study of the German national consciousness, which is beyond the limits of our present

work. To give a complete interpretation of German sociology, one would have to consider all of the writers in the various sciences which have been influential upon sociology, a few of which have been mentioned above. It is, however, possible to secure an adequate understanding of German sociology by considering some of the most representative men in this branch of science.

We shall, therefore, not attempt to give a more detailed historical account of the rise of German sociology than we have so far presented; nor shall we present a complete analysis of all of the German sociological theories. We shall consider carefully the following writers only: Schaeffle, Gumpłowicz, Simmel, Ratzenhofer, Ludwig Stein, Tönnies and Paul Barth. We have selected these writers because they represent more perfectly the various sociological theories current in Germany than any other small group of men who could be named. Most of the other writers upon sociological subjects may in some way be related to one or more of these authors.

Nor is it possible for us to present a complete interpretation of all of these six sociologists. We shall have accomplished our purpose, viz., to give an adequate interpretation of German sociology, if we select from the works of this small group of sociologists some topics which they treat more or less in common, and through comparison and analysis, interpret the points of similarity and difference. In this comparative study, we shall have occasion to refer frequently to some writer outside of our selected group, whose views bring new light on the point under discussion, or relate him in some way or other to the subject. Thus it will be possible to emphasize the salient features of many writers.

The principal topics which will be considered may be broadly stated as follows:

1. What is society in the sociological sense of the term?
2. What, according to German sociologists, is a proper definition of sociology, and what should be its field of activity?
3. What is the relation of sociology to the other sciences, and especially to the special social sciences?
4. What are the main factors in the social process?

It may seem from a glance at these topics that we are limiting our study of German sociology chiefly to methodological problems and that we are avoiding mention of the deeper questions of this science. When, however, one stops to look over the field of German sociology, he will notice that it is devoted almost entirely to methodological topics. Consequently, he who would interpret the writers of this group must confine his attention largely to the problems discussed by them. It is for this reason that the questions we have chosen to discuss are primarily ones of method.

After a consideration of these topics from the point of view of German sociology, we may then have a basis for criticism and for an attempt to answer the fundamental question, in how far is German sociology real sociology, and how well does it solve these problems necessary to any adequate interpretation of society?

CHAPTER I

What is Society ?

ALTHOUGH German sociology may be designated as the most recently developed national school in this science, on the question, what is society? more has been written in German than in almost any other language. There is something vague and indefinite about the general concept "society," which lends itself to the speculative tendency of the German mind. From the philosophical speculations of Kant, Hegel, Fichte, Schelling and other writers at the beginning of the nineteenth century, to a complete system of modern sociology, there is a larger and wider interval than that of years. But in this interval of thought there have sprung up among German writers on social questions a variety of ideas as to the nature of society, some of which we shall present in the following pages.

The various answers of German sociologists to the question, what is society? may be conveniently grouped under three heads. Society is viewed by the Germans, on the one hand, as a unity, either mechanical or organic, a great whole, sometimes considered as co-extensive with humanity. It is also considered as an aggregation of more or less compact groups. A third class of thinkers look upon society, not as a unity, nor yet as an aggregation of unities, but consider its essential element to be a social process, a constantly changing equilibrium.

1. Society as a Unity.

When men first began to speculate about the nature of society, it was natural that they should look upon it as a unity. The most simple conception one can have of a mass of people, whether humanity as a whole, or simply a national or other group, is that of a unity, with the individual members as the constituent parts of the whole. Thus the ideal society of the Old Testament prophets, Isaiah, Jeremiah, Zechariah, Ezekiel

and others, was a city or a nation, mechanically united into a compact unity. The earliest speculations of the Greeks and Romans on the nature of society, were all concerning it as a social organic unity.¹ And thus, when Kant and Hegel began to revolutionize the thinking of the Germans, their ideas of society naturally comprehended these older ideas, and society was still conceived as a unity, an organism. This view, strengthened by Schelling,² Comte, Hegel, von Stein, Bluntschli, von Baader, and later by Spencer, Lilienfeld and Schaeffle, has exercised one of the greatest influences over German sociology. The tendency of the later exponents of this view has been to get away from a strictly literal interpretation of society, viewed as a living organism, as, for instance, Hobbes' *Leviathan*, and to think of it rather as a unity, with striking analogies to an organism, which analogies afford a good interpretation of the societary body.

This tendency is most marked in the earlier writings of Albert Schaeffle. Many sociologists, even some of his ardent admirers, have interpreted the sociology of Schaeffle as a physiology and anatomy of a real living social organism. Doubtless the first edition of his "*Bau und Leben des socialen Körpers*" gave sufficient ground for this popular view, although even in the preface of this early work he says he wishes to guard against the abuse of the analogy, and warns against the dangers of a homology, and in the second edition, 1896, he repeatedly emphasizes this fact. In his posthumous work, edited by Karl Bücher, Schaeffle, while still holding to the belief in a societary unity, dispenses with practically all biological analogies. It is useless to deny, however, that in the enthusiasm of applying his biological analogies, Schaeffle may perhaps have been carried away at times, as when he says, "Even in other relations, which do not belong directly to evolution and dissolution, the social body manifests itself as different from the material structure and forms of motion of organic and inorganic nature, not in essence (*wesentlich*) but only in degree" (*graduell*).³

¹ Cf. Stein: "*Wesen und Aufgabe*," 12, 13, notes.

² *Werke*, VI, 575

³ *Bau und Leben*, I: 12.

To Schaeffle, society was a unity bound together by psychical processes of inter-relation of men. Society is a whole, whose simplest elements are the psychical acts of the individuals who are brought into contact with each other, which acts are related to a sub-stratum of objective goods or property (*Sachgüter*). In a criticism of René Worms' "*Organisme et société*," Schaeffle compares the literal organic interpretation of that writer with his own, and says, "The difference between us exists in this fact, that I place the emphasis on that which is entirely peculiar to society, rather than on the organism, viz., on national capacity (*Volksvermögen*) and the social-psychological equipment of language, writing, traditions, etc., and have used the biological analogies only in part for illustrating the social phenomena, and partly for pointing out the inner relationship of all circles of humanity."¹ "The social body is society (*Gesellschaft*) in the widest sense of the word."² "The social body is a whole composed of inorganic and spiritual (*begeisteten*) masses, of physical, psycho-physical and psychical moments, whose counterpart may be found in the pre-social realms of existence and activity."³ "By society, or the social body, is here meant the entire nation, and national existence (*Völkerdasein*), that is, the entire people and folk-life."⁴ "The human society is the idea-content (*Inbegriff*) of people united together into a community the moral folk-world" (*Völkerwelt*).⁵

These quotations show how Schaeffle considered society as a unity, with psychical factors, such as the will activities of the individual and physical factors, such as property, all flowing together and blending into a harmonious whole. "The starting point of human society is the horde, which differs from the herd or animal society in that it is 'mental,' that is, a union produced by higher conscious willing, feeling and thinking, and not through blind impulses, unclear sensations and dim or vague ideas."⁶ Society is to him like a huge human body,

¹ *Zeit. f. die ges. Staatsw.*, 53: 568.

² *Bau und Leben*, I: 10.

³ *Ibid.*, I: 12.

⁴ *Ibid.*, I: 1.

⁵ "*Abriss der Soziol.*," p. 25.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 16.

though by no means one in a real sense. "Society is a living consciousness, an organism of ideas."¹ It may be viewed in many different ways, and may be divided up for purposes of analysis into all of the different parts that go to compose the human body. But, after all analysis, when viewed as a whole, society is one, a unity, bound together with physical and psychological fibres.

In the most popular book of Paul Barth, "*Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Sociologie*," it is difficult to discover the author's own view in regard to the nature of society. One realizes from Barth's criticism of Schaeffle, Spencer, Lilienfeld, Fouillée and Worms, that he holds to a view of society somewhat similar to these writers, but a clear statement is not given. In one of a series of articles, however, which appeared after the publication of this book, in "*Die Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*," Barth gives a clear-cut and lucid statement of his own view, as well as a defense of the organic theory in general.² In this article Barth shows conclusively that he belongs in the same class with Schaeffle, holding even with more tenacity than that author, the view that society is an organism, a unity. To prove the organic existence of society, Barth advances proof to show that society answers the three criteria for judging an organism, laid down by Kant in his "*Kritik der Urteilskraft*." These three characteristics of an organism are: (1) The parts are possible of existence only in their relation to the whole; (2) these parts of the organic body are so bound together into a unity of a whole, that they are reciprocally to each other *cause* and *effect* of their form; (3) the whole is capable of producing a new whole, capable, not only of active force, but also of constructive power.

Barth then shows that the organic unity differs from the mechanical unity in its use of the two factors, desire and free choice of will, and that the three criteria of Kant are valid. He concludes the argument at this point with these words, "and, if one recognizes as fundamental to the idea of an organism the

¹ "Abriss der Soziol.," p. 14.

² Cf. "Fragen der Geschichtswissenschaft. I, Unrecht und Recht der 'organischen' Gesellschaftstheorie," 24: 69.

three characteristics established by Kant, then is society also an organism. * * * But a fundamental difference prevails between the physical organism and society. The element, out of which the former is composed, is and remains physically, or at least psycho-physically, the cell. The element of society, on the other hand, is man (*der Mensch*), and he not indeed as a body (*Körper*), but as a willing entity (*wollendes Wesen*). That man not with his body, but with his will, is a part of society, is shown most clearly by the fact that he may at the same time belong to different societies, while his body can be found only in a single one of these. His body cannot be divided, but his will can. * * * As a rule, one understands by 'society' only those lasting unions (*Vereinigungen*) of men which have been created neither by nature, through blood-relationship, nor those which have grown from the ones thus created." ¹

The true "society," according to Barth, is not derived from these direct primitive needs. Over and above the civil and political society, or under it (as the case may be), we have many others, which are the true "society." For example, when the German folk accepted a new religion, they superimposed upon the civil society, a mental society, a religious society. And thus, "as the religious society can exist over the existing one, so also there may exist over or under it, a wider new society, with new purposes, in which all or some enter with a new part of their wills." Further examples may be international congresses or associations of scholars. The only essential for a society, according to Barth, seems to be that "it forms a unity, which strives to preserve itself and to grow," and if they do this "they form an organism," *i. e.*, a society.² And so, since the individual thus enters into society only with his will, "we are justified in calling society a "will organism."³ Since the tendency of the evolution of man has always been for the human mind to rid itself more and more from the impressions and influences of the outer world, and to extend the field of human consciousness, Barth says, "this tendency of social life above all for a stronger domination through the mind, may be better expressed through the term 'mental organism,' which appears to me as

¹ *Op. Cit.*² *Ibid.*, p. 81.³ *Ibid.*, p. 83.

the most peculiar designation for the specific nature of society." ¹

Kant's first characteristic of an organism, Barth demonstrates in his "mental organism," society, by showing that a society must be a unification of minds, if it exists at all, and the more compact this unification of minds, the more compact is the unity of society. Thus the parts cannot exist without the whole.

As to the second characteristic, Barth says "the reciprocal relation of the members (of a society) is comparable to that which exists between the artist and the public, the pupil and the teacher." ² "The human mind needs society more than the human body." ³

"When we consider the third trait of Kant's," says Barth, "the capacity of the organic body to produce out of itself a new body, this capacity may also be easily found. The everyday reproduction of society, so far as it is a mental organism, happens through education (*Erziehung*), which, with advancing civilization, becomes more and more extensive, and more and more intensive." ⁴

While the plain statement of this view of a mental organism is, in a measure, peculiar to Barth, Schaeffle, even in his earliest work, recognized the psychological nature of the social body, and in his later works, emphasizes this feature repeatedly. Barth seems to forget this fact when he writes in the article above quoted: "The lack of the biological sociologists (in which class he includes Schaeffle) is that they limit themselves only to the natural, and all the civilization which reaches beyond the limits of nature is outside of their system." ⁵ And in another place he says, "The error of all former representatives of the organic theory exists in the fact that they do not recognize the mental essence of the social organism, but want to discover only as many marks as possible, which are common to it (society) and the animal world." ⁶ In defense of Schaeffle, at least ⁷ it may be said that his "*Bau und Leben*," in discussing "social psychology," ⁸ "social variability," adapta-

¹ *Op. Cit.*, p. 83.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 90.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 103.

² *Ibid.*, p. 92.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 93.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 84.

⁷ Our task does not in this place call for defense of other adherents of the biological schools.

⁸ I: 176, sq.

tions and inheritance,¹ as well as a large part of the second volume on "Special Sociology," considers topics which are strangely akin to the problems Barth has presented in his "mental organism." And in his more recent book, "*Abriss der Soziologie von Albert Schaeffle*," Bücher shows how deeply rooted in Schaeffle's mind were the mental and psychological aspects of the social unity. Although, in some respects, the "mental organism" of Barth is a superior creation to the "social body" of Schaeffle, the two have more in common than either of their respective authors would be willing to grant.

A sketch of the German views of societary unities would hardly be complete without a consideration of the social organism theory of Paul von Lilienfeld. Although this eminent Russian has written most of his work in French, the appearance of his "*Gedanken über die Socialwissenschaft der Zukunft*" in German about the same time as Schaeffle's first work, justifies his place in this study. When Lilienfeld published his first work, in the seventies, he believed he had found in the method which he proposed the "open sesame" for all future sociological theories. He held that society was a real, living organism, with all of the characteristics of an organic body,² a view which he did not change up to the time of his death. This social organism, however, he held to be distinct from all other forms of organic life, in that its predominant characteristic is not a union of physical or physiological cells, but a union of nerve cells, a psychological union. This union gives to society a super-organic character.³ A second peculiar characteristic of Lilienfeld's organism is that these nerve cells are bound together by a material inter-cellular substance, which, in fact, is nothing more than a sort of projection, or essence from the nerve cells themselves on the external environment. Everything which exists apart from living human beings belongs to this inter-cellular substance, such as, for instance, houses, money, land and even formulative ideas.⁴ In an article criticising Stein's "*Die sociale*

¹ I: 360 sq.

² *Gedanken*, I: 47, 80, etc.

³ *Gedanken*, I: 139, *La Pathologie sociale*, 43 sq.

⁴ Cf. *Gedanken*, I: 176; II: 118, 125, 128, 133 sq.; *La Pathologie sociale*, 95, 102, 138.

Frage," in "Die Zeitschrift für Socialwissenschaften"¹ Lilienfeld says, "The purely human society, as such, represents a higher phase of collective evolution (than the animal herd life). It began with the feeling, thinking and willing together (Zusammen denken, fühlen und wollen) of a large number of men united through blood relationship, or through living with each other—men who had already outgrown the animal similitude." Lilienfeld holds that before men combined thus consciously, they were not societies, but simply "discrete collectivities" like trees of a forest, the individuals of a herd, etc." "That the co-operation of men in the social union, beginning with the family life up to the state life, is analogous to the co-operation of the cells in the individual organism, and especially the nerve cells of the brain as the highest potentiated organ of our nerve system, is clearly shown by the process of co-operation itself."² This psycho-physical process of co-operation of men in social life proves that "the social, like the individual, must be conceived as a concrete entirety, as a real organic system of cells, tissues and organs." Lilienfeld tries to show how the social body is a real organism in three particulars, viz: (1) "The economy of the social life corresponds in a real sense to the physiological activity of the individual organism; (2) the united structure of the social body, determined by law, corresponds to the morphological formation of plants and animals; (3) finally, the hierarchical membering of society, which culminates in the state life, corresponds to the superiority and subordination of functions in the organs used for uniting of the life of individuals."³ In this same connection, Lilienfeld tries to show that his social organism is of much higher potency than the natural organism. He says, "We believe that we are justified in adding here that reproach has wrongfully been brought against our system, as though through it the social organism has been identified with the natural organism. We have several times shown not only the analogies, but also pointed to the differences in both, and

¹ I [1898], 109, "Über Socialphilosophie. In Anknüpfung an das Werk von Dr. L. Stein: Die Sociale Frage."

² *Ibid.*, p. 110.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 111; Cf., Gedanken and La Pathologie, in *loco*.

we have not refused the due estimation of the psychical factors and motives which characterize the social life as of higher potency than ordinary life."

This view of society as a concrete social organism gave Lilienfeld the basis for his theory of social pathology, and tended to represent the sociologist in the role of the physician diagnosing the ills of society and prescribing the proper remedies for these sicknesses. Lilienfeld's method has had some vogue in Germany, but more in France. Friedrich von Baerenbach¹ held strongly to this outgrowth of Lilienfeld's view, if not so strongly to his general conception of society.

Ferdinand Tönnies's conception of society places him naturally in our first group of thinkers, those who consider society as a unity. To understand what Tönnies means by the word "society," one must read his book "*Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft*."² According to Tönnies, there are (or were when he first wrote, in 1887) two theories of society, which may be stated in opposition to each other, as the mechanical and the organic. The former received its best formulation in Hobbes and Rousseau. The latter may be well illustrated in the writings of Lilienfeld. Tönnies blends these two views in his analysis of human social grouping. There are, according to Tönnies, two great classes of groupings among human beings. The first, community, (*Gemeinschaft*) is essential, necessary, organic, and rests upon the natural distinctions in human life. The other, society, (*Gesellschaft*) is occasional, mechanical and rational, *i. e.*, it rests upon considerations of utility, and is, therefore, a conventional or contractual union of independent self-conscious individuals. The family may be taken as a type of *Gemeinschaft*; the trade union as a type of *Gesellschaft*. In community, as Aristotle states, the whole is before its parts. The parts are produced by and function as organs of the whole. Their life is included in that of the community. In society the parts are,

¹ Die Socialwissenschaften, Zur Orientirung in den socialwissenschaftlichen Schulen und Systemen der Gegenwart." Cf. pp. 3, 9, 10, 192-209.

² "Abhandlung des Kommunismus und des Socialismus als empirischer Kulturformen."

on the contrary, before the whole. The whole exists through the arbitrary coming together of the parts. It is produced as a servant of the purposes of the individuals. It lasts only as long as it performs this service. If the individual does not find any profit in it any longer, he may abandon it.

The psychological basis of community is what Tönnies calls essential will (*Wesenwille*). By this he means the natural existence of men, as it is expressed originally in their impulses, struggles and activities. It is natural will, or in reality, not will at all, simply the natural outgrowth of the proximity of like individuals. It may be compared with Professor Giddings' view of "Consciousness of Kind." The psychological basis of society is arbitrariness (*Willkür*) or expressed, manifested will. It is the will determined through thought, conscious consideration and reflection of ends and purposes. According to Tönnies, all social life may be formulated as a movement from community to society, and all mental life as a movement from essential will to expressed will.

This view of Tönnies makes society a mechanical unity, whose very existence depends upon the arbitrary common will of its members. In a later discussion of this subject, Tönnies has given a different designation to the term society, although he still holds for it the same content.¹ In this article, society is called a "corporation," in distinction from the biological organism of Lilienfeld, or the psychological unity of Schaeffle or Barth. Under a "corporation" Tönnies includes "all social units whatever in so far as they have this trait in common; that the mode of existence of the unity, or whole, itself is founded upon the consciousness of its existence, and consequently that it perpetuates itself by the conception of its reality being transmitted from one generation to the next one; which will not happen unless it be done on purpose by teaching and generally in the form of tradition. This evidently presupposes human reason and human will." Society is here thought of as "a psychical or moral body, capable of willing and acting like a single human being." Tönnies admits that his idea of "corporation" is based on Hegel's

¹ Cf. "The Present Problems of Social Structure," *Amer. Jour. Sociol.*, 10: 569.

categories in his "Rechtsphilosophie," where he defines corporate existence under the three-fold heading (1) the family as "thesis;" (2) civil society as "antithesis" and the (3) state as "synthesis" of the two former.

In many respects the view of society which Rudolph Stammler has expressed in his "Wirtschaft und Recht" ¹ is similar to that of Tönnies. For Stammler society is a unity in the sense that it is a group of human beings "externally ruled," as he expresses it. That is, society is not a promiscuous gathering, an aggregation without end or aim, composed of isolated individuals. It is a union regulated by laws of outside nature, which laws are possible of deduction and definition, just the same as are those of other sciences.

There is an echo of Tönnies's philosophy of society in Wundt's "Völkerpsychologie" ² and in Rudolph Eisler's sociological expression of the latter's view in the book "Soziologie." ³ Eisler formulates in sociological terms some of the elements of Wundt's work, such as the differences of purpose; the collective consciousness; the relation of all social life to former will actions; the idea of the expanding community sense to even larger groups, and finally to the collective organism of the human race, ending in humanity. These ideas have in them a semblance of Tönnies's theory of society or corporation, and so may be mentioned here.

Karl Bücher is another German writer on sociology who has held to a theory which would make of society a unity. Like his life-long friend and instructor, Schaeffle, Bücher also holds to the general view that society is a psychological unity, bearing many resemblances to a human body. A. Nordenholz, in the "Archiv für Rassen und Gesellschaftsbiologie," of which he is one of the editors, has expressed himself as a believer in the view that society is a unity, bearing strong analogy to the physical organism. He says that the denial of the unity of society would be tantamount to denying its existence. Society must be viewed

¹ Nach der materialistischen Geschichtsauffassung. Eine sozialphilosophische Untersuchung.

² 1: 190 sq.

³ "Die Lehre von der Entstehung und der Entwicklung der menschlichen Gesellschaft.

as a whole, though consisting of parts functioning at the bidding of the common will.¹ Ernst Victor Zenker also champions the organic view of society, following Schaeffle for the most part in his analysis.²

2. *Society as an Aggregation of Groups.*

In contradistinction to the sociologists who look upon society as a unity, there are two German sociologists in particular who consider society to be simply an aggregation of groups, with more or less definite boundaries. These two writers are Ludwig Gumplowicz and Georg Simmel.

For Gumplowicz, society has as many different connotations as there are possible groups. On the other hand, society and the state are more commonly considered as one by him. He says,³ "The great number and variety of mutually related groups within the state, considered as a whole, is called society in contrast from the state. In this wider sense, society is not different from the state; it is the same thing, viewed from another point. But in the narrower and more accurate sense of the word, each group centering about some one or more common interests, is a society." Thus every individual belongs to many societies. Whatever interests, economic, civic, religious, or other claim his attention with those of other men, these form the center of a group, or a society. "Thus a government official may own a large estate, be a zealous adherent of a religious sect, and be a sugar manufacturer also."⁴ Gumplowicz admits that "much would be gained if we could use 'society' simply to designate a concrete number of men united by permanent relations," but he cannot see how we can do this and still give adequate valuation to the numerous temporary groups of social life.

All social groupings, however, according to Gumplowicz, may be traced to one or more of three fundamental principles, material, economic and moral.⁵ Groups grow and develop through struggle and conflict.⁶ Thus the State, Gumplowicz defines as

¹ See articles, in this periodical for April, 1908, and January, 1907, "Soziologische Probleme" and "Normalitaet und Abnormalitaet in der Sozialoekonomie."

² "Die Gesellschaft."

³ Outlines of Sociology," tr. by F. W. Moore.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 136 sq.

⁵ Outlines, 141.

⁶ *Cf.* Der Rassenkampf.

"the organized control of the minority over the majority,"¹ or in another place as "a majority of conquered and subordinated social groups," who are in conflict, on the one hand, for the preservation of the whole, the state, and on the other, for that of the individual groups.²

So society, in the large, may be viewed as a continually changing kaleidoscope of social groups, with certain groups always striving for the mastery over the others. Or, on the other hand, society may be looked upon as an aggregation of individuals, dividing themselves up arbitrarily into groups or smaller societies, according as their material economic or moral interests call them.

While in some respects Simmel's conception of society is very like that of Gumplowicz, there is a fundamental difference. Like Gumplowicz, Simmel holds that any group may receive the designation of a society, but the difference between them lies in their conception of what is a social group. To Gumplowicz, a social group is any aggregation united by some interests. There need not necessarily be anything conscious or purposive in the group of Gumplowicz. To Simmel, however, a group is a deeper relation. It is a number of people, two or more, who are reciprocally interacting upon one another. To Gumplowicz the bond which unites the group is external, to Simmel it is internal and psychological. Thus Simmel holds, "Society in its broadest sense is found wherever several individuals enter into reciprocal relations. From a purely ephemeral association, for the purpose of a casual promenade, to the complete unity of a family, or a guild of the middle ages, one must recognize socialization (*Vergesellschaftung*) of the most varying kind and degree."³ "Any number of men," says he, "does not become thereby a society simply because in everyone an actual, definite, individually moving life-content exists. But only where the life-content assumes the form of mutual inter-action, when an action of one upon the other takes place, either directly or through

¹ Outlines, 118.

² Die Sociologische Staatsidee, *Zeitsch f. die ges. Staatswiss*, 49: 370 sq.

³ "Problems of Sociology," *American Acad. of Pol. and Social Science*, Pub. 161, 1895, p. 54.

a third party, then out of the bare spacial proximity, or the temporal succession of men, a society is created.”¹ Another definition taken from his “Ueber sociale Differenzierung” is even more striking. “Wherever a union has taken place whose form remains even if the individual members break away and enter new relations; wherever a common external property exists, whose inheritance and whose protection is not a matter of individual work; wherever a sum of knowledge and moral principles exists, which through their partition to individuals become neither increased nor diminished, which, having become entirely reliable, are ready for each who desires to have a part of them; wherever law, morals, or traffic have been formed, to which each one submits and must submit himself, who enters into a definite spacial connection with others—there, above all, is society; there the mutual interaction has solidified itself into a body which differentiates it as social, in distinction from those who disappear with the subjects coming directly into play and their instantaneous condition.”² After all, he concludes, on the same page, that “there is only a difference of degree between the loosest union of men and the most comprehensive unity of people in morals, speech or political action.”

Simmel's society is divided into two parts, form and content, which are inseparable.³ The form of a society is what Simmel calls the socialization, and is in reality a constant process in society. The content, on the other hand, is composed of the changing elements that make the external reality of the group or its concrete existence. Thus, for example, the form of a class in school is the reciprocal play of mental influences that bring the class together and that hold it together as a class, that which distinguishes it from other groups, and which makes all classes have something in common. The content of this group, on the other hand, consists of the material and actual conditions of each member of the class or the class as a whole. So there may exist for Simmel an abstract society.⁴ Writing in the *American Journal of Sociology*,⁵ Simmel says, “We must

¹ “Soziologie,” Leipzig, 1908, p. 7.

² Op. Cit., p. 16.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

³ “Soziologie,” p. 6.

⁵ 2: 167.

distinguish two senses of the term 'society,' first, the broader sense, in which the term includes the sum of all individuals concurring in reciprocal relations, together with all the interests which unite these interacting persons; second, a narrower sense, in which the term designates the socialization, or associating as such, *i. e.*, the interaction itself, which constitutes the bond of association in abstraction from its material content." The former would represent the content, the latter the form of society. The latter is the strict sociological sense of the term, however.

If we would then broadly distinguish the views of Simmel and Gumplowicz, we might say that the latter (to adopt Simmel's terminology) considers chiefly the content as essential to the formation of a social group, while the former lays emphasis on the form as the only true sociological sense of society.

In many respects the theory of society which Richard Schubert-Soldern advances is similar to that of Simmel.¹ In the very beginning of his article he says, "Men do not enter into community simply by living in proximity to each other, not just by bringing their bodies into contact. In the outer world there is no tie which could unite them. If men were tied up into bundles, they would be human bundles, but not communities. Community needs an inner relation, which can be brought about only through reciprocal opening up of the inner-life." This reciprocal relation must be a conscious active one, and not a mere spacial sharing of one another's lot. "If through the reciprocal consciousness of their feelings men have also the inclination to influence others reciprocally," then there may exist two kinds of society, enmity and community. The former arises from a feeling of repulsion, and produces the inclination to opposition. The latter comes from a feeling of liking, and produces an inclination to harmony and furtherance of present conditions."

3. *Society as a Process or an Association*

The difference which marks off our third group of writers from the second is not so well defined as that which separates the

¹ Cf. "Individuum und Gemeinschaft," *Zeitsch. f. d. ges. Staatsw.* 55: (1899), p. 57 sq.

two former classes. In the first group of writers, the emphasis was laid upon the fact that society was a unity; the second group emphasized that society was an aggregation of groups. Our third group, however, places emphasis on an entirely different feature, namely, that society is an association, and as such is in a more or less fluid state, a changing equilibrium. It is possible, therefore, for a sociologist to hold this last view of society and still have in his picture elements from the two other conceptions. The difference between the second group and the third one lies largely in the distinction between an aggregation and an association. It is one thing to view humanity as an accumulation or aggregation of groups, even if within the groups sufficient room for associations be allowed. It is a quite different thing to consider it as an association, with the fundamental element in the process being not the group, but the association and the inter-relation of the members of the groups.

It is this point of view that distinguishes the sociology of Gustav Ratzenhofer from that of his colleague, Gumpłowicz. While the latter sees in society an ever widening conflict of social groups, the result of the struggle seems to be either a continued conflict or a larger group. Thus society for Gumpłowicz might be a huge aggregation of units or groups, embracing all humanity, or it might be one single national or clan group, isolated by physical conditions. Against this view, Ratzenhofer says, "Society is no cross-section or average phenomenon (*Durchschnittserscheinung*), but a *process* of all individual phenomena, in which the law of human reciprocal relations is fulfilled." In other words, society is not a fixed unit, but a process, a "becoming."¹ "It is, therefore, from a sociological point of view, not allowable to speak of 'humanity,' because natural history has not proven its unity, and because many races and many stocks are outside of that social relation. It is also not allowable to speak of a 'human society,' for the idea society demands that the needs and interests of the related parts of all men should become satisfied through actual association. The idea humanity or human society is idealistic, and, therefore, sociologic-

¹ "Die Sociologische Erkenntnis. Positive Philosophie des socialen Lebens," p. 3.

ally impossible.”¹ A society exists, according to Ratzenhofer, wherever there is socialization, and this occurs “wherever men are thrown together or mutually submit to each other.”² In other words, “The entirety of those men and social structures who stand in inter-relation with one another, or who are suited for material inter-relations forms ‘the society.’”³ A “society,” then, may be defined as “the social structures, which, inter-changing with one another, form out of this exchange into higher unities.”⁴

From the horde, with its primitive approach to bestial life, up to the modern civilized state, society is a constantly changing and newly developing unity. Now it is composed of one set of men bound together by a chain of interests, which give to them a reciprocal inter-relationship. Now this chain of interests has become longer, or perhaps shorter, and that society has become a different one. Society is a moving and changing mass. It is not a psychological unity in the sense of Schaeffle or Barth, nor yet a physical organism in the sense of Lilienfeld. It is not a group or a composition of groups as Gumpłowicz would say, nor is it a series of abstract forms, into which a social content may be moulded. (Simmel.) It is all of these, and more. Society is a mass of human beings, possessing certain elements of unity, and divided up into certain diverse groups, but its essence lies in neither of these factors. The essential characteristic of society is association, and this viewed, not as a fixed or constant factor, but as a constantly changing relation. This is Ratzenhofer’s view of society in distinction from that of some of the others we have noted.

In many respects, the conception of what constitutes a society, which Ludwig Stein expresses in his writings, is similar to that of Ratzenhofer, though different also in some important particulars. Like Tönnies, Stein makes a radical distinction between community and society. The former, according to Stein, may be seen in the primitive structures of human life, which

¹ Op. Cit., p. 227.

² “Soziologie. Positive Lehre von menschlichen Wechselbeziehungen,” p. 10.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 151.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 150.

were of an instinctive nature, and were brought together by the inherent sociability of man.¹ Society, on the contrary, is formed through conscious purposes and for definite ends, and presupposes a certain accord of wills and minds. Society is then a growing association of men, banded together for conscious purposes. Society does not appear to be, as the "organicists" would hold, an 'organism,' but rather an organization. The organism is the unconscious, the organization, the conscious working together of the individual parts of an accepted whole for a common purpose."² This "organization" of Stein's appears to bear some resemblance to the society which Ratzenhofer considers. The difference, however, is again not a fundamental one, but one of emphasis merely. While Ratzenhofer emphasizes the fact that human association is a changing state, dependent upon the interests that form it, Stein considers the fact that this association is dependent on one common purpose. In the broadest sense, society is public opinion. Its fundamental pre-requisite is a united intelligent people.³ To him and for his method, this point of view is fundamental. Society for Stein is, indeed, an association, for his "organization" is more than an aggregation, just as it is more than an organism. But the association which Stein conceives has its essence in the end which it sets for its goal. His view may thus be designated as a more mechanical statement of the general idea which Ratzenhofer has advanced.

Rudolf Holzapfel has given a clear expression to some of Stein's ideas in an instructive article, entitled "*Wesen und Methoden der sozialen Psychologie.*"⁴ "Society is a complex of individuals who sociably associate with each other." The emphasis is on the word "sociably," an emphasis which distinguishes society from the mere aggregation, on the one hand, or the purposive "organization" of Stein on the other. Society cannot be viewed as the mere sum of a number of forms or groups,

¹ "Die Sociale Frage im Lichte der Philosophie, Vorlesungen ueber Socialphilosophie und ihre Geschichte," pp. 36, 56 sq., 66 sq.

² *Wesen und Aufgabe der Sociologie*, p. 36.

³ *Die Sociale Frage*, p. 504 sq.

⁴ *Archiv f. system. Philosoph.*, IX (1903), p. 1 sq.

as Simmel or Gumpłowicz would have it, but in the truest sense, it is merely a modification of associational relations. In other words, society becomes formed out of a group thrown together by any chance, when there arises in this company a feeling of sociability, which is the root of all society.

A more analytical statement of the whole concept, society, has seldom been given than that which appears in Berthold Thorsch's "*Der Einzelne und die Gesellschaft.*" For Thorsch, neither the individual nor the community nor the group are fundamental. The fundamental thing in social life is the complex of relations which exists between the individual and his group. For the concept society, the first presupposition must be to recognize in it a changing system of elementary relations, a moving equilibrium.¹ Instead of individuals and in place of communities (*Gemeinschaften*) Thorsch considers rather society, the complex of relations between these two.² But society is not to be defined by any one single element or group of elements, it is the result of an incalculable wealth of elements. "Individual and community should not be set opposed to each other, but complexes of different wealths of variation, different wealths of exchange, different fineness of equalization processes."³ The constant change in our categories of thought (what to-day appears as "more," as community, is to-morrow "less") demands that society be not viewed as a fixed state, but as a complex of other partial complexes, which is in essence but a fleeting state, and is all the time changing.⁴ "Each single society-element changes its character continually."⁵ Neither the individual nor the community are constant and abiding categories. The "all", a metaphysical designation for societary unity, appears to Thorsch to be the sociologists' "society" in the truest sense.⁶ As a whole, Thorsch's work lays the emphasis on the reciprocal relations between the individual and his social group, which process, when combined with many of a like nature, makes up the concept society. His society is, then, like that of Ratzenhofer, a process of associa-

¹ *Op. Cit.*, p. 32.

² *Ibid.*, p. 36.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 44.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 46.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 70, sq.

tion, and differs from the view of Ratzenhofer only in that it analyses the relation of the individual and the group to the society more in detail.

We have now discussed what the principal German sociologists have to say about the concept society. While there is an apparent difference in most of these views, they are in the main complementary one to another, or similar in essential aspects. The consideration of society as a unity, psychological, physical or mechanical, is not incompatible with the idea of society as an aggregation of social groups. Society may be a whole, but even that most ardent enthusiast of the biological homology of the physical organism and society, Lilienfeld, insists with vigor that the social body must be dissected and cut up into sections in order to be fully comprehended. And just here the theory of Gumpłowicz or Simmel might find a note of harmony and a place of mutual agreement, even if this agreement be expressed in different language. And so, too, the holders of the view that society is a process of association would find much in common with those who hold the unity or the aggregation view of society. As pointed out above, the emphasis is merely on a different phase of society. Why should it not be possible for one to view society as a unity, within which are to be found numerous other group unities, and still consider the parts and the whole as a constantly changing and shifting equilibrium, an association resting upon the reciprocal inter-relations of the various units?

These different views of society, which the German sociologists have given us, may then be combined to make a more comprehensive and broader view, which shall include all of these fundamental ideas, but which shall still limit the concept to a definite set of human relations.

CHAPTER II

Definition and Scope of Sociology

LUDWIG STEIN is probably correct in the main when he says, "A universally satisfactory definition of sociology can only be possible when sociology shall be developed and brought to a final settlement in its most important parts. Definitions do not anticipate sciences, but they succeed them."¹ Stein might have added that this statement was particularly applicable to his German colleagues. But, on the other hand, it is true that every science that starts on its maiden trip across the broad sea of knowledge must have in view some goal toward which it strives and also some more or less clear idea as to the course to be followed and the field to be covered in reaching the goal. The very naming of the science of human relations "sociology" by Comte and the placing of it in his scientific hierarchy was in essence a definition. And so, while most of the German sociologists have gone little beyond the experimental stage of getting their bearings, there are among them a large number of attempts to define sociology, attempts which may be considered perfectly valid, notwithstanding Stein's objection.

In some cases the peculiar aspect from which the German author views society gives a special coloring to his definition of sociology. In others, the conception of society has little or no effect, while in a third class society seems to be taken for granted, and sociology is defined in terms that leave the reader in uncertainty.

The definition of sociology is affected also among the German writers by the relations which it bears to the other sciences. The idea of a science without a field of work distinct and separate from all other fields of knowledge is, to the German scholar, an impossible one. He must set definite boundaries within which

¹ Sociolog. Papers, London, 1904, p. 247.

the new science must work, and if he cannot do this, he will have nothing to do with it. In point of fact, it has been this peculiar lack among the German sociologists, and this failure to delimit the sociological field sufficiently, which has retarded the development of sociology in Germany. The emphasis laid within recent years on this fact is leading to a wider and wider recognition in Germany of the true place of sociology among the sciences.

In view of this situation among the German sociologists, we shall consider the definition of sociology under two heads, the scope of the science and its relation to other sciences, particularly to the other social sciences.

1. *The Scope of Sociology*

Sociology, according to Schaeffle, whom we consider first under this heading, is "a philosophy of the special social sciences,"¹ and is dependent upon these special sciences for its further definition.² When these special social sciences shall have completed their task, sociology may be able to fairly and with security enter its own field of labor, the construction of a general philosophy of the special sciences. While Schaeffle says expressly that he refrains from answering the question as to whether sociology is a mental science, or whether, reversed, all mental sciences is not rather sociology,³ the whole tendency of his work is in the latter direction. If we could analyze with certainty the economic relations of men; if we could find out their various motives and purposes; if we could tell what in social life brings men together, or drives them from each other; if we could trace in human life the trend of all these, and other social factors—then we would be in a position perhaps to found a social philosophy, which would deal with the combined reactions of all of these factors one on another. The discovery, in the meantime of the social factors and their analysis is not the task or scope of sociology. This work belongs to the special social sciences. And yet, in his last work, Schaeffle expressly declares that he will give a system of sociology.⁴ It can hardly

¹ *Bau und Leben*, I: 1.

² *Ibid.*, 1 and 2; *Abriss*, 4 sq.

³ *Abriss*, 4.

⁴ *Abriss*, 1.

be said, moreover, that the special social sciences are so far complete to-day as to afford a basis for Schaeffle's definition, nor, on the other hand, is it true that Schaeffle's last book, in presenting a system of sociology, clings very closely to the definition he outlined in the first section of his "Bau und Leben des sozialen Körpers?"

While in Schaeffle's sociology the idea that society is a unity is all-pervasive, he insists constantly that this unity should be divided up into parts in order to be sociologically considered. And so he divides all social phenomena under two great heads, viewing them as normal and abnormal societies on the one hand, and as phenomena in a course of evolution on the other. And within these two fields is a two-fold third one, which divides the field up according to its static phenomena of institutions or its dynamic phenomena of functions.¹ When one notes this division of the field of sociology, he finds difficulty indeed in reconciling it with the definition of sociology as an all-embracing philosophy of the special social sciences. To be sure, there is room here for a large amount of philosophical speculation, as well as for an unlimited field of specialized labor. But the treatment which Schaeffle gives to the data which he has at his disposal is rather that of a scientist deducing his generalizations from carefully-worked out and empirical premises, than that of a philosopher generalizing from an *a priori* basis and fitting his conclusions to the whole social structure as best he may.

It is a question, indeed, in view of these facts, if Schaeffle ever had a clear conception of a field of sociological endeavor, which he could define in terms that would be of use to himself as well as to others. We are not saying that Schaeffle was not a sociologist, nor that he did not give us a system of sociology. We are saying, however, that his system lacks the clear-cut decisiveness which Ratzenhofer's system, for instance, possesses. The reason why Schaeffle's system is so little understood, and so often mis-stated, may be found as much in this unfortunate lack of emphasis in the right place, as in the excessive use of biological analogy.

Like Schaeffle, Ludwig Stein, on the one hand, would extend

¹ Abriss, 7.

the scope of sociology so that it should include all of the other social sciences within itself, and become virtually a social philosophy, and, on the other hand, he would give to sociology a comparatively limited field, which could not be invaded by other sciences. "Sociology is in its origin and method a philosophical science," whatever that contradiction in terms may designate.¹ "Sociology is, as Comte rightly says, the philosophical controller of all social individual specialisms."² "Man has, after innumerable vagaries, returned from the dream fields of the absolute and has in sociology elevated his own existence to the central point of scientific interest."³ These few quotations from different works of Stein show the semi-metaphysical and inexact manner in which he considers sociology. His little monograph, to which we have already referred, "*Wesen und Aufgabe der Sociologie*," gives the best statement of his definition of sociology. But even here we find many contradictions, and one is at a loss always to reconcile the definition of sociology as a social philosophy to it as a special social science, with a distinct inductive method.

Stein distinguishes three aspects of society, the ontological, or society viewed in its mere spacial relations of living together; the historical, which considers it in its "typically repeated common actions," or the succession of social phenomena; and the normative, which views it "in its common tasks and purposes, in its social 'should-be'" (Sollen).⁴ The descriptive social sciences find their task in the first aspect, the historical and genetic in the second, and the ethical ones in the third. But "sociology attacks the problem of human society at the same time from all of these sides. * * * Just as philosophy, according to Comte's and Wundt's definition, finds and justifies its existence in drawing the final generalizations from all sciences, in order to be able again to place them in indisputable relations to one another, so sociology has the task of investigating the reciprocal

¹ "Die Sociale Frage," 14.

² "Sociological Papers," London, 1904.

³ "Der Sinn des Daseins. Streifzüge eines Optimisten durch die Philosophie der Gegenwart," p. 224.

⁴ Op. cit., p. 5.

human inter-relations, *i. e.*, all forms of human association and co-operation, in order that it may be able to prepare out of and on the basis of this universal consideration of society life a social world conception. * * *. Sociology is, accordingly, in its fundamental essence, a philosophy of society—a social philosophy.”¹ The distinction between social philosophy, or sociology, and philosophy in general lies merely in the limitation of the field of the former to generalizations about human association.

Stein makes also a distinction between a rule and a law. The former is applied to social phenomena, which are so liable to inexactness and complexity that they cannot be said to repeat themselves with a sufficiently unvarying regularity to be called laws. Sociology is, therefore, not a science of laws, nor yet even a science of rules. It is “merely a descriptive science of phenomena.”² Sociology occupies a middle position between a science of laws and a science of phenomena. (*Ereigniswissenschaft.*) It mediates the transition from one to the other.”³ Its task is to fill the gap between natural science and history, between collective action and individual action, between law and phenomena, between species and pattern, between individual and environment.⁴ This does not hinder sociology, however, from being a science, but it can never be exact. Sociology, like meteorology, can never be an exact science.⁵ It will grow more and more exact, and may perhaps attain to a certainty in its prognosis of from 90 to 95 per cent.

Sociology may also be designated as a science of the “rhythm of human phenomena,” or of social statics, as distinguished from dynamics. As such, Stein considers sociology in the light of a grammar of the social life. “Just as the grammarian deduces out of the past the rules by which a language should be spoken, so the sociologist should establish out of the social past the teleological rules of motive, by which men should act.”⁶

When, in 1902, “*Die Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*” added to its name the words “und Sociologie,” Paul Barth, the editor, in commenting on this new departure, said, “Philosophy and sociology form no chance or arbitrary

¹ *Wesen und Aufgabe*, p. 6.

² *Ibid.*, p. 15.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

connection, but belong together as science and life. * * * None of the existing sciences can give an answer to the following vital questions: How is the peaceful association of men to be preserved? What is socialism; what is individualism? To which of these two, or, if to both, in what mixture does the future belong? Is there a moral progress of humanity, and upon what factors of social life is it dependent? How and in what direction is there perfected an inner mental transformation of the human type? By treating such questions, sociology becomes identical with the philosophy of history, as it naturally is, since all historical life means social life."¹

Barth has given nowhere else a better summary of his definition of sociology and its scope than this one. No sociologist will deny that the problems he has stated are fundamentally a part of sociology, although few seem willing to admit that they belong by virtue of this fact, at the same time to philosophy of history. Sociology, however, according to Barth is more history than anything else. In his "*Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Sociologie*" he says that sociology "is nothing more than history attained to consciousness of its task;"² and that "the task of sociology is to reconstruct history." In the preface to this work he says, "history appears to me to be a concrete sociology, just as a drama is a concrete characterization;"³ and again, "a perfect sociology would cover itself completely with a philosophy of history. They differ finally only in name."⁴ Speaking before the British Sociological Society, Barth said: "All historical phenomena are, I think, social phenomena, because what is not determining nor typical for the life of a society, never is nor ever has been the object of history * * * Therefore, sociology, scientifically treated, is identical with history, scientifically treated * * * The science of history is usually named philosophy of history. Therefore sociology is the same as philosophy of history."⁵

Enough has been quoted to show how Barth, like Schaeffle and Stein, would also make of sociology an all-embracing philosophy

¹ Vol. 26, 1 sq.

² Pp. 4 and 19.

³ P. IV.

⁴ P. 10.

⁵ "*Sociological Papers*, London, 1904.

of social relations. Barth is even more explicit in his statement than either of the two others. His articles in various periodicals, since the appearance of the first volume of the book above mentioned, show his method of interpretation to be that of the historian colored with some social philosophy.¹ Barth's definition of sociology on the whole, makes of it a history, rather than making of history a sociology.

In spite of the fact that Schæffle, Barth and Stein all insist on extending the definition of sociology, so as to make of it a social philosophy, none of these three writers has succeeded in giving a very definite content to his philosophy—a content which might be broadened out to the limits of the field claimed for sociology. Schæffle has, indeed, made a considerable advance in this direction, but his entire work seems to be one-sided and to lean too strongly to the economic. Barth and Stein seem to have the larger field in view, but neither of them has given us the right sort of content to fill the territory thus claimed for sociology.

Gustav Ratzenhofer has made the nearest approach to this problem of any of the German sociologists. Whatever may be said against the sociology of Ratzenhofer, it must be admitted that he has not only claimed for his favorite science a wide, all-embracing philosophical field, but he has in addition given us a content for this field, a content which is co-extensive with his definition of sociology.

Sociology is to Ratzenhofer a philosophy of all human reciprocal relations. "Its task is to discover the fundamental tendencies of social evolution and the conditions of the general welfare of human beings."² "Sociology is the philosophical basis of the science of human reciprocal relations and of their essential expression, politics (*der Politik*). What physics and chemistry are for natural science, the sciences of human inter-relations are for sociology. What mechanics is to the material forces, the theory of politics is for the social forces."³ Sociology is a philosophy which gives to all of the special sciences of human rela-

¹ Cf. "Die Geschichte der Erziehung," *Vierteljahrschrift f. wiss. Phil. und Soc.*, 1903.

² *Am. Jour. Soc.*, Sept., 1904, p. 177.

³ *Die sociologische Erkenntniss*, p. 6.

tions their proper color. Without sociology, the special social sciences cannot properly work. "Sociological knowledge¹ is an indispensable pre-supposition for all sciences which deal with human associational relations. Since man as an individual is in part the product of these relations, this knowledge becomes also an indispensable presupposition for all sciences, which deal with him particularly, in so far as it gathers its knowledge directly through the aid of natural science. Sociological knowledge is indispensable to psychological knowledge as much as is physiological knowledge. * * * All sociological investigations hitherto are in vain, since they are lacking this philosophical foundation, which is in itself a synthesis of all the inductive sciences."²

This sociological philosophy must not be considered as comprehending all philosophy. It is really but a part of what Ratzehofer terms "positive philosophy." And under this sociological philosophy or "Erkenntniss" we may still place, as a sub-division, sociology. Although Ratzehofer held that sociology was thus limited to a part of his general "Sociologische Erkenntniss," the real distinction in the content of these two terms seems to be vaguely held, and they are often used synonymously in his work of 1898. And while the following quotation from the introduction of his posthumous book (1907) seems to indicate a distinction, the contents of the work hardly warrant much stress on this difference. He says, "Because the reciprocal relationship of human beings are an utterly distinct scientific territory, although they are in correlation with all other scientific fields, they constitute a distinct philosophical problem, namely, the sociological, which remains unsolved, even if we presume that the cosmological, the psychological, the mathematical, and the logical problems are closed. The social relationships of men, or properly of all organisms, are, in a word, subject to a regularity which is immediately contained in no other order of regularity, but pertains to this order of relationship as an added factor. It is the task of epistemology (Erkenntnisstheorie) to make out the causality of all problems, and to determine the

¹ Or epistemology, as Small translates the word "Erkenntniss."

² Die Sociologische Erkenntniss, p. 251.

relationships of the different orders of regularity in the realms of the cosmic, the physical, the organic and the social.

"Philosophical insight into the origin of the reciprocal relationships of human beings, into the essence of the social forces, and into the regularity of their operation, constitutes as a portion of positive philosophy, 'sociological epistemology' (*sociologische Erkenntniss*). This remains within the boundaries of philosophy.

"When, however, research crosses the boundaries of philosophical epistemology, by investigating the biological and psychological elements of social life in the light of their practical facts, the realm of sociology begins. The latter, as science of the reciprocal relationships of human beings, determines the fundamental characteristics of social development, in order to derive from this basis principles of the ways in which social phenomena may be controlled in the interest of civilization.

"Upon its philosophical basis, therefore, sociology will classify the phenomena of the reciprocal relationships of human beings, it will search out the factors of social development, and within this process, it will try to determine the working of natural law in general and of sociological law in particular. Sociology is not called to investigate the numberless incidents of social life, but its province is to work over the results of minute investigation of particular types of occurrences, for the purpose of arriving at a unified survey and comprehension of the coherent regularity of all social phenomena." ¹

According to Ratzenhofer, philosophy is powerless without sociology, and the reason for its impotence and loss of favor has been due largely to a mistaken notion of its field. In a "Selbstanzeige" of his, "Die Sociologische Erkenntniss," ² he says: "Former philosophy is powerless to attack the social problems ³ because it supposes that it can deduce the all from individual phenomena. On this account, and because it has become a servant of the natural sciences, philosophy has lost its proper reputation. It feels itself powerless, and believes, out of the

¹ "Soziologie," pp. 2, 3.

² Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Phil. und Soc., 22: 461.

³ Such as that of politics, which he mentions.

narrowness of its psychological-physiological view-point, no longer in its metaphysical and ethical mission." "While philosophy has in the main hitherto recognized only two principal fields, psychical life and the phenomena of the material world, there remains a third territory, by it too little considered, which also has a psychical life, as well as the phenomena of the material world—the society life. The society life points to the instincts of man as the explanation of the position of every individual as distinct from the generality. * * * A philosophy without a sociology is like a psychology without a physiology; it is a speculation given over to subjective fallacies. Along with cosmological, psychological and ontological problems belong also the sociological, for our thinking is not entirely circumscribed, until to the idea of the world, I, and eternity, are added those of human reciprocal relationships. * * * Sociology seeks, therefore, not the concrete investigation of single social phenomena—that is the task of the special sciences related to it—but it purposes rather the investigation of the society life in its conformity to law." ¹

We may sum up Ratzenhofer's definition of sociology and its scope as follows: Sociology is a philosophical science of human reciprocal relations. As such, it does not deal with any particular group of human beings, nor with any special factor in human inter-relations. Its scope is rather mankind as a whole, and its data are derived from a synthesis of all of the data of the special sciences that deal with human reciprocal relations. It will thus be seen that while Ratzenhofer has extended sociology over a vast field of human life, he has still definitely limited it. Sociology is neither history, nor economics, nor yet a general philosophy. It is a definite science, distinct from any of these or the other special sciences, and has a definite set of data to work over, with a definite scope and a definite method. The military training of this soldier-sociologist shows nowhere to better advantage than in the clear precision with which he has shown what he conceives sociology to be, and what not to be. He has, moreover, in his entire work, been consistent with his

¹ *Sociologische Erkenntniss*, pp. 5, 6.

definition, a consistency which has resulted in giving us the clearest and one of the earliest attempts at a system of sociology.¹

When August Comte placed sociology at the head of his hierarchy of sciences, he unwittingly opened up two possibilities for the future development of the infant science. In the first place, sociology might be viewed as a highly refined and assimilating science, drawing its elements perhaps from the various special sciences placed under it by Comte, or, on the other hand, sociology might be considered as an all-embracing science, which included in its field all the life of social beings, both man and animal, and even that of inorganic nature. The former view would lead to the consideration of sociology as a specialized branch of social science in general. The latter view, would place it as a universal history or philosophy of social life, with more or less limited scope. Strangely enough, the trend of modern sociology from Comte to the present day, has been along one of these two lines. Some sociologists have fought to limit the field of sociological study to a particular side of human life, or to particular interpretations of social phenomena, which would place it forever distinct from all other special social sciences. Others have sought to extend the vision of the sociologist until it should embrace all of the fields now covered by the social sciences, and would become in itself the social science *par excellence*—an all-inclusive social philosophy.

The most fundamental distinction between the definitions of sociology given by Schaeffle, Stein, Barth or Ratzenhofer, on the one hand, and those of Simmel and Gumplowicz on the other, lies just in this difference in the trend of sociology. While the first group of writers would make of sociology a philosophy of social relations, encompassing the sum total of all human association, the latter group seek to limit the field of this science to a definite set, or a definite manifestation of human relations.

In discussing the various views of society held by German sociologists in a former chapter, we emphasized the distinction which Simmel makes between the form and content of society.

¹ Cf. "La Sociologie de Ratzenhofer," by Gumplowicz in *Revue Internationale de Sociologie*, April, 1908, p. 252.

It was noted that by form Simmel means all of those psychological bonds which bring about particular socializations and hold them together. By content he means in general the actual material relations of each group. Before giving Simmel's definition of sociology, we must here note more fully his distinction between form and content, as given in his "Soziologie."¹ Form and content "are in reality inseparable elements of each social existence and event." "However manifold may be the interests, out of which in general these socializations are produced, the forms in which they are perfected can, nevertheless, remain the same. And, on the other hand, the inherent like interests may be manifested in very differently formed socializations, as, for example, the economic interest realizes itself as well through competition as through carefully-planned organizations of producers, now through exclusion exercised toward other economic groups, now through union with them. The religious life-content demands now a democratic, and now a centralized community-form, remaining in content the same throughout. * * * Just as, therefore, the form can be identical, while it perfects itself in the most divergent interests, thus also the matter (Stoff) can remain, while the inter-relations of the individuals, which it conveys, manifest themselves in a variety of forms."²

The problem of sociology, in view of this distinction between form and content, may be stated briefly, as the analysis of social forms. Sociology is, as it were, a sort of social geometry, to use Simmel's own figure.³ The task of sociology is to present the laws of social forms, regardless of their content, just as geometry presents the laws of spacial forms, without any consideration of what may be their content. Thus, a circle is a circle to the geometrician, whether it encompass water, air or paper, or whether it be a mere abstraction. So to the sociologist, a group of students is the same in social form regardless of whether it contains a certain race of men, or men of a particular religion, or only men of a certain economic status. The number, the conflicts within the group, the spacial expansion, the psychological

¹ Pp. 6, 7, sq.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 8, 9.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

connections—these would interest the sociologist and would form the subject matter of sociology. These are elements of form, as opposed to the elements of content given above. The content is of no interest to sociology, except in so far as it has an effect on the form of the group.

"It is, therefore, the task of sociology," says Simmel, "to describe the forms of socializations of men and to find the laws according to which the individual, in so far as he is a member of a group, and the groups themselves stand in relation to each other."¹ For this purpose sociology may draw its material from other sciences, and in so far it is an eclectic science.² "It belongs to that type of science whose specialized character does not lie in this, that its object belongs under a higher general concept, along with others (as classical philology and germanics, or optics and acoustics), but in this fact, that it advances into an entire field of objects, under a special point of view."³

The idea of sociology as a method seems to be strong with Simmel, and in some places he calls the science simply a new method. "Sociology, therefore, in its relation to the existing sciences, is a new method, an aid to investigation, in order to get at the data of all of these fields in a new way."⁴ But sociology is more than a method alone. It may be that, but it is also a science which seeks to master a definite field of social relations. In replying to the critics of a paper which he gave in Schmoller's "Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung," in 1894, on "Das Problem der Soziologie," he says: "The discovery of new material facts cannot generally be held to be incumbent on sociology, as a new science, but rather the working over of the ascertained facts and their presentation through abstraction and combination, from a new point of view, the essence of which seems to me to consist in the separation of the content and form of social events."⁵ A year later, in the "American Journal of Sociology," he wrote,

¹ Über soziale Differenzierung, p. 4.

² *Ibid.*, 2.

³ Soziologie, 10.

⁴ Soziologie, 3, cf. 4.

⁵ "The Problem of Sociology," Philadelphia, 1895, p. 61.

"The desideratum (of sociology) is to discern in the countless historical groupings, the principles of group formation as such, in order that we may approximate the laws of the influences which human beings exert upon each other in their reciprocal contacts—laws which in themselves are not affected by the material causes or purposes of these contacts, although the different contents of socialization will, of course, lead to various combinations, different degrees of strength, and different courses of development in these forms of contact. And, as we reach a science of religion by turning our attention away from all other interests of life except religion, or at least by treating them merely as accidents; as we gain a science of language by abstracting language and its immediate psychological conditions from everything that lies beyond, although as a matter of fact there would never have been utterance without the excluded concrete motives, so we shall gain a sociology by seeking to recognize the laws, form and development of socialization, which, to be sure, in reality determine life only together with other functions and forces, but which, nevertheless, can constitute the subject-matter of a distinct science only in abstraction from these other factors." ¹

This definition is one that would distinguish sociology from all other sciences, and in particular from philosophy. While Simmel does not expressly deny the right to the existence of a social philosophy, he makes it plain that there should be, in his judgment, no relation between such a philosophy and sociology. Sociology is not a philosophy. It is a limited science.² Its field does not embrace all human association, any more than psychology comprehends every act of the consciousness in its sphere.³ Sociology is a science of human relations limiting itself solely to the *forms* in which these relations are manifested.

The tendency to limit the definition of sociology to a particular phase of human association is manifest more strongly in Ludwig Gumplowicz than in Simmel. The field of sociology which Gumplowicz stakes out is hardly as broad as that claimed by

¹ "Superiority and Subordination," 2: 415; cf. "Soziologie," 22.

² "Soziologie," 26.

³ "The Problem of Sociology," 53.

Simmel. The latter of these two would make of sociology a science, descriptive of the forms of the multifarious groups which are caused by human socialization. Thus he would include in sociology a consideration of the parts or members of a group in so far as these affect its forms. The former, on the contrary, sees in sociology a science merely of the inter-relations of groups. The members who compose the group have no significance for sociology. The group as a whole, and that only, in its conflict and inter-group action, is significant.¹

The task of sociology, according to Gumplowicz, then, becomes one of describing, and analysing group action.² But sociology is more than a descriptive science. It is a science of law, and herein lies its most essential task. "The function of sociology consists in showing that universal laws apply to social phenomena; in pointing out the peculiar effects produced by them in the social domain, and finally, in formulating the special social laws."³

The "universal laws," which Gumplowicz mentions here are the following: (1) The law of causation; (2) the law of development; (3) regularity of development; (4) the law of periodicity; (5) the law of complexity; (6) reciprocal action of foreign (heterogen) elements; (7) adaptation to an obvious end; (8) identity of forces; (9) similarity of events; and (10) law of parallelism. These laws should be applied by sociology to social phenomena, as they now apply to the mental world. But more than the application of these universal laws, the task of sociology is to find, by means of these, the special laws that govern social phenomena.

Here the distinctive feature of Gumplowicz's sociology appears, *viz.*, in his definition of social phenomena or social facts. "By social phenomena we mean," he says, "the phenomena which appear through the operation of groups and aggregates of men on one another. The aggregates are the social elements."⁴ "When two or more distinct groups come in contact, when each enters the sphere of the other's operations, a social process

¹ *Soziologische Essays*, pp. 6, 63, 65; *Outlines*, pp. 83 sq.

² *Essays*, 11.

³ *Outlines*, 82.

⁴ *Outlines*, 83.

ensues. So long as one unitary, homogenous group is not influenced or does not exert an influence upon another, it persists in its original primitive state. * * * But as soon as one group is exposed to the influence of another, the inter-play of mutual forces ensues inevitably, and the social process begins.”¹ Social facts, also, originate only in the inter-working of groups. “A social fact is such that it has been created not by individuals, but by groups, as such. For the creation of a social fact, at least two different (heterogene) groups are necessary.”² “In contradistinction from descriptive history, which relates to personalities and their actions, sociology employs only social facts, social actions, perhaps even the trend of ideas, and social-psychological phenomena. It works with all of these, but not with individuals.”³

There can, therefore, according to Gumprowicz, be no social phenomena, no social processes, no social facts, no social laws, and hence no sociology outside of the realm of inter-group action. Sociology is the science, whose business it is to find out what are the laws of group action. With all of the world of facts and laws, governing human relations outside of this sphere, sociology has nothing to do.

Many more attempts by German writers to define sociology might be given. They could all of them, however, be included under the two tendencies we have discussed among the six authors we have treated. Whether sociology should in reality be an all-inclusive philosophy, or a highly-specialized science, with a narrowly limited field of observation, is an open question. Some attempt to answer it will be made in a later chapter.

¹ Outlines, 85.

² Essays, 65.

³ Essays, 63.

CHAPTER III

Definition and Scope of Sociology

(Continued.)

2. *The Relation of Sociology to Other Sciences*

IN the last chapter we dealt with the definition of sociology in relation to its scope, or the extent of the field of human life which it embraced. In this chapter we consider the other side of the definition, that is, its relation to the definition of other sciences. We were obliged, for the sake of clearness, to anticipate this chapter in discussing the views of some of the authors considered above, but the emphasis laid by German sociologists on the relation of sociology to science in general demands from us a separate consideration of this subject.

That a very large part of German sociology has up to the present time been devoted to the discussion of methodological problems, particularly to those which refer to the definition of this science, is not to be wondered at. Most of the German sociologists and those who have made an attempt at sociological discussion, have felt it incumbent upon themselves to apologize for and vigorously defend their attitude. The bitter rivalry and jealousy among the various social sciences, such as political economy, history, ethnology, and also among what the German calls the "mental sciences," such as philosophy and psychology, has made it imperative that, before sociology could gain a foothold in German thought, its relations to these other sciences should be carefully defined. It was the failure of sociologists to appreciate this fact that for a long time brought about the denial to sociology of its true position. And even still, it can hardly be said that sociology is accepted by the scholars of Germany as a true, distinct and pure science. By the great majority of them it is either ignored, or looked upon merely as a method or point of view, which may be applied to any science. It is on account of this peculiar situation that we consider more in detail what

German writers have to say concerning the relation of sociology to the other sciences.

(1) *History and the Philosophy of History.*

None of the German sociologists have gone so far in relating sociology to any of the special social sciences as has Paul Barth in his extreme view of the relation of sociology to history. We have stated his view in part in a former chapter. It will be necessary here simply to emphasize again the fact that Barth makes the philosophy of history identical with sociology. The latter science is only a new name for the former. As a matter of fact, Barth would much prefer to drop the name sociology, and to revive the former science of history by means of a sociological content.¹ To Barth, history is more than a mere recording of human processes and relations, as Wundt defines it in his "Logik."² Wundt's attempt to make out of sociology a science of social statics³ and out of history rather a science of dynamics, appears to Barth to be untenable.⁴ Barth would rather include under the philosophy of history both the statics and dynamics of society, if indeed he would be willing to grant that there is a social statics at all.

The way in which Ludwig Stein relates sociology and history is somewhat more definite. Instead of applying to history a blanket generalization and then naming this generalization "sociology," Stein limits historical science to the mere chronicling of events and of the lives and actions of individuals. Sociology, on the other hand, does not deal primarily with these events of history, but with the rules and principles of their periodicity. He says: "If sociology had to deal only with individuals, as does history, if it had for its use no statistical material for the recording of social regularities, no typically repeated mass-phenomena, no periodically-recurring social phenomena, then it would, indeed, have no justification for its existence as a science. Without the relative periodicity of social events, soci-

¹ Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Sociologie, 10, 12.

² Second Edition, II, 438.

³ *Ibid.*, 614 sq.

⁴ *Ubi Supra*, 11, 12.

ology as a science would be inconceivable."¹ The historical event is to Stein but a single (einmaliges) occurrence. The social event is "one of a definite rythm, periodically repeated."

As to the relation of sociology and the philosophy of history, Stein is very emphatic in his statement: "Sociology differs sharply and intentionally from the philosophy of history not only in the method, but also in its goal. It divides with philosophy of history the problem of the evolution of society.

"If the philosophy of history in its course thus far has proceeded to construct deductively, sociology seeks first to collect all the empirical facts of social life accessible to scientific investigation, and then to sift them, in order to finally describe in a logical, inductive system the totality of all social facts within the range of human experience. * * * While the philosophy of history attempted to discover the entire world-plan, that is, by the roundabout way of history, to arrive at God as the last cause of existence, sociology, which takes over the inheritance of history-philosophy, proceeds much more carefully. It acknowledges the philosophy of history and sees in it its predecessor—we may say its alchemy or its astrology."²

In spite of this apparent denial of the right of the philosophy of history to a place as a science, Stein's method, which he calls the "historical method," leans strongly toward what Barth designates as the philosophy of history. Stein's historical method presupposes, as above stated, that historical phenomena repeat themselves in rythms or cycles. This periodical repetition of social phenomena does not form a *law*, but rather a *rule*. The distinction which Stein brings forward here is that "to laws man *must* subject himself; to rules he *should* subject himself."³ Sociology, as a science, has for its task the finding out and the classification of all the possible rules of social-historical rythms. This gives to sociology a historical method, in distinction from any method which views society as a static condition, such as the so-called "organic" method.

The peculiar and limited view of sociology, which Georg

¹ Wesen und Aufgabe, 16.

² Die Sociale Frage, 24.

³ Wesen und Auf., 17.

Simmel has presented, effectually distinguished this science for him from history or its related philosophy. If sociology is merely a science of social forms, these forms may be considered without special regard to their place in history. But, on the other hand, Simmel has given us a good distinction between the field of sociology and that of history in his little book, "*Die Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie*." Simmel holds that "History is always an application of psychological laws."¹ "It appears to me," he says, "if there were psychology as a science of law, historical science would then be applied psychology in the same sense in which astronomy is applied mathematics." Further expanded, Simmel's view is that the basis of all true historical portrayal of events is the psychological character of the events portrayed. The historian must live mentally in the time and through the events which he describes. He must experience over again the feelings and mental processes which moved the people whom he would present historically. Only thus can the true psychological character of history be attained.

It is this peculiar subjective analysis of historical events that has given to Simmel's sociology its value as a detailed psychological analysis of social processes within smaller or larger groups. Just as the historian abstracts from the world of real events some concept about which he groups the events he wishes to portray, so the sociologist "must separate out as an object of special investigation the purely social elements from the totality of human history, or to express the same thought with paradoxical brevity, he discusses that which in society is "Society."² In other words, history, for Simmel, gives only a descriptive picture of events, while sociology analyzes the picture into its constituent parts. The task of the philosophy of history is to bring all historical facts in their entirety under certain general concepts, such as the psychological law above mentioned. The task of sociology, on the contrary, is to restrict itself to the immediate psychological interpretation of certain small groups of actually demonstrable phenomena.

Ratzenhofen, with his positive monism, insists that history,

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 3.

² *The Problem of Soc.*, 56, 57.

as well as the other sciences, are nothing more than hand-maidens to sociology, furnishing for the latter science the material from which it must deduce its laws. "For just as each natural phenomenon in a general sense was an event (*Geschehnis*) and had a historical process, thus also is history only a relation of natural phenomena, which occur among human beings, and it is thus the center of all sociological thought to show that such cultural or political events are subject to natural laws as natural phenomena." ¹

Gumplowicz also rejects history as a fundamental basis of sociology. In the first chapter of his "*Sociologie und Politik*," he argues that the domain of sociology is as distinct from that of history as could possibly be the case between any two sciences. History, according to Gumplowicz, who seems to follow some of the older schools of historical science, deals only with the actions of individuals. With the social as such, or at least with it from Gumplowicz's point of view, history has nothing to do. Sociology is a science of laws. History is a science merely describing certain events in human life, with little or no regard for their social-legal relation. As to the distinction between the philosophy of history and sociology, Gumplowicz is even more emphatic. The most important difference between sociology and the philosophy of history is that the latter would deliver an opinion on a whole which it did not know, "whereas sociology, being aware that the whole can never be known, will judge only of a process which is seen here and everywhere, which transpires in the same way to-day before our eyes as it transpired thousands of years ago." ² The task of sociology is much more limited than that of the philosophy of history, and consequently is so much more capable of solution." ³

(2) *History of Civilization:*

In discussing the relation of sociology to the philosophy of history, Gumplowicz says: "The history of human civilization from its beginning to the present day is almost, and at

¹ *Die sociologische Erkenntniss*, p. 12.

² *Outlines*, 64.

³ *Ibid.*, 199.

least might easily become, sociology.”¹ This leads us to mention here the work of two writers in the particular domain of “Kulturgeschichte,” whose writings are of particular significance in German sociology. We refer to Julius Lippert and Kurt Breysig.

Lippert sees in the history of civilization the explanation of all social life. “To make life clear in all of its phenomena, both in those which are the final product of long series of evolution, and in those which constitute the numerous slowly-evolving residues; to present the progress of the evolution of humanity as an organic structure, including even of necessity its mistakes, and to arrive from such fundamentals to an understanding of the present in all its forms—this should be the goal of a history of civilization.”² This statement makes the history of civilization practically co-extensive with sociology. The treatment which Lippert applies to the facts in his history is in the main sociological. In the preface of his work, he admits that sociology gives the basis of his theory. He considers, for instance, that the care of life, or self-preservation (*Lebensfürsorge*) is the basic principle in all cultural, social and moral advance.³ As the care of life expands itself from mere self-preservation of the individual to the self-preservation of the family, the stock, the community or the race, civilization accordingly evolves and expands, and individual selfish considerations give way to higher and more altruistic motives.⁴

Breysig limits the task of history to the description of “only the social, or, better stated, the moral relations of men to one another.”⁵ “All actions as well as all thought and education may be explained in the activity of the struggle of personality, the love of self, self-expression, or the opposite impulses of self-denial, affection, thirst for love and protection. These instincts of the heart dominate in the world of history.”⁶ Breysig shows

¹ Outlines, 64.

² “Kulturgeschichte,” Vol. I, 1.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 311.

⁵ Kulturgeschichte der Neuzeit. Vergleichende Entwicklungsgeschichte der führenden Völker Europas und ihres sozialen und geistigen Lebens,” p. viii.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. X.

how the desire of the individual, on the one hand, to deny himself for his community and, on the other, to elevate himself at the expense of his community is the basis of all art, science and religion, as well as of all social structure.¹

The principal difference between Lippert and Breysig is not in the field which they outline for the history of civilization. Both would include in this domain all the mental, moral and social life of a people, not considered as individuals, but treated as a unit. The chief difference, however, is in the emphasis which Lippert places on the more objective relations and factors of life, as contrasted with the subjective factors, which Breysig emphasizes. Although neither of them denies to sociology a rightful place in the social sciences, they both extend their own particular field so as to almost exclude sociology entirely.

Alfred Vierkandt, in his most recent work, "Die Stetigkeit im Kulturwandel," and in many of his other writings, gives to the history of civilization a more sociological bearing than do either Lippert or Breysig. In the work above mentioned, he seeks to show how modern civilization is simply an accumulation of the civilization of former people. There is no such thing as a new civilization, but the mental and cultural life of every social group has in it certain elements of continuity, which follow definite laws in their mutation or stability. While this fundamental thesis is not exactly new, the way in which Vierkandt has developed what he calls the "mechanism of civilization mutation" connects the school of history which he represents with some of the most recent sociological attempts to find the laws of social evolution.

(3) *Ethnology:*

Related to and overlapping to a large extent the field of the historian of civilization is the province of the ethnologist. The former builds upon the work of the latter, and in Germany, the tendency has been for the sociologist to base his conclusions upon both. The sociology of Gumpłowicz is based, in the first instance, entirely upon ethnological data.² The work of Stein-

¹ Op. cit., pp. 23-31.

² Cf. "Der Rassenkampf."

metz in sociology owes not a little to that author's training in ethnology. Steinmetz holds that the task of the sociologist would be vastly simplified if he made use of the material furnished by the ethnologist, and that some of the problems of sociology would find in ethnology a ready solution. He does not hold that sociology should surrender to ethnology. On the contrary, he subordinates ethnology to sociology.¹

The work of Adolph Bastian, while not claiming to be sociology, has brought to German sociology a rich mass of material, and has helped to give to this science a more empirical basis. In fact, Bastian's work, particularly that of his earlier years, borders closely on the field of sociology.

(4) *Biology:*

The great advances of biology in the last three decades have brought that science into intimate relation with German sociology. The earlier sociology of Lilienfeld and Schaeffle would have been quite impossible without its biological basis. Laying aside the aptness of the use of the analogy, as employed by these two writers, many German sociologists are seeking even to-day a sound biological basis for their theories. The work of Ratzenhofer roots in biology. The materialistic tendency to trace everything social back to one inherent interest must presuppose a careful relation of biology to sociology. So closely does Ratzenhofer in his entire work relate these two sciences, that he might much more aptly be designated a 'biological sociologist' than either Schaeffle or Lilienfeld.

(5) *Psychology:*

While this tendency to relate sociology to biology is very manifest among the Germans, the close relation of sociology to psychology is even more manifest. We have touched upon this relation in former chapters. We wish here simply to relate it to our general theme. There is not a sociologist of note writing for the German public to-day who does not relate his science to

¹ "Die Bedeutung der Ethnologie für Soziologie," *Vierteljahrschr. f. wiss. Phil. und Soc.*, Vol. 26; IV Heft.

psychology more or less closely. From the attempts of Lilienfeld to inspire a psyche into his social organism, to the social psychology of Eulenberg or Holzapfel, the close relation of these two sciences is seen.

Simmel bases his entire sociology on psychology, and could not proceed at all in his analysis of social forms without the aid of this science. Ratzenhofer must find in psychology just as substantial an ally as he has obtained in biology. The history of the evolution of Schaeffle's theory in his own mind may be stated as a movement from biology to psychology with the aid of sociology, or better perhaps, in the construction of sociology. Even Gumpłowicz, with his materialistic conception of sociology, finds in psychology a powerful aid. And Tönnies also, although he does not give psychology full credit for its influence on his own view, still grants to this science a large place in the domain of sociology.¹

Wilhelm Wundt, in his "Völkerpsychologie," has given us an elaborate study of the myths and traditions, the speech and language and the morals and ethics of a people by means largely of psychological analysis of data accumulated through ethnology and philology. Franz Eulenberg has shown how sociology may be designated more properly, in his view, as "social psychology,"² a view in which R. Holzapfel coincides. Theodore Lipps would go so far in his relation of psychology to sociology as to practically deny the physiological any part in the latter science. The fundamental task of sociology is to analyze and formulate the laws of the inner relations of men, such as those of love, hatred, sympathy, pity or joy.³ The sociology of Eleutheropolus, Kistiakowski, Kariev and Achelis might be mentioned in further illustration of the close relation of psychology to sociology by German writers.

¹ Cf. "The Present Problems of Social Structure," *Amer. Jour. Sociol.*, March, 1905.

² Cf. "Über die Möglichkeit und die Aufgabe einer Socialpsychologie," *Jahrb. f. Gesetzgebung, u. s. w.*, 1900, pp. 201-237.

³ "Die Sociologische Grundfrage," *Archiv für Rassen und Gesellschaftsbiologie*, September, 1907, pp. 652-674.

(6) Other Sciences:

We might discuss the relation of economics to sociology, taking up the work of Bücher, Dietzel, Oppenheimer, or Schmoller along these lines, but it will be sufficient to say here that this science is generally considered by sociologists of Germany to be simply an auxiliary or a correlative science to sociology. The same may be said of ethics, anthropology, statistics and others of the social sciences.

We have given enough facts in this chapter to show how the various sciences have been related by German authors to sociology, and at the same time have shown how this relation has helped or hindered in the definition of our science. We shall consider next what the various writers in our selected group of sociologists consider to be the fundamental and basic phenomena in social life, and how, from this basic principle, social evolution takes place.

CHAPTER IV

Some Characteristics of German Sociology

MOST theories of sociology are capable of distinction according to one or more principal characteristics. It is easy, for example, to distinguish the theory of Gabrielle Tarde by his principle of imitation. Durkheim's idea of social constraint or social pressure places his view, with those of Le Bon and Sighele, in a class by themselves. Giddings' idea of consciousness of kind, expanded and simplified later to the idea of stimulus and response to stimulus, marks his theory as a distinctive one. Thus we may be able to characterize almost any sociologist by some one aspect of society or some element in social life upon which he has laid particular emphasis.

This fact holds true, to a limited extent, in German sociology. The newness of the science and the fact that, as stated in our introductory chapter, it has been largely an importation and an imitation of other national schools, may be taken for the reason why German sociological theories lack some of the definiteness which distinguishes the theories of other nations. Sociology is still an indefinite science with the Germans, largely because they have been unable to state their theories in terms that would distinguish them from every other science, and would mark them as peculiar. We are not implying that every national school has a distinct sociological characteristic. We mean, however, that German sociology, as a whole, is difficult of comprehension, just because its promulgators have not seen fit to limit their theorizing to definite lines of thought. German sociology, as a whole, may be characterized as a general social philosophy, rather than as an inductive limited science. There are some exceptions to this statement, and these we wish to consider.

Of the various German writers on sociology, none have stamped their theories more indelibly with one definite charac

teristic than has Gumplowicz. Over the surface covered by his field of sociology are marked in large letters two words, "Social Group." To-day it is almost an axiom of sociology that the social group is to be considered as an elemental part of society, and as *the* elemental part most capable of observation. When Gumplowicz, in the early eighties, however, first wrote that the social process was a constant struggle of social groups, he was ridiculed and laughed at by the German writers on social topics. Society had been viewed since Aristotle, as a whole, an undivisible unity. It was, therefore, with no little misgiving that Gumplowicz launched his theory, as the preface to "Der Rassenkampf" shows, a misgiving which was well founded. The whole idea of the prominence of the social group, small or large, was so foreign to German thought of the early eighties, that, even to-day, by many this element of social life is denied a true place.¹

With Gumplowicz, the group is of supreme importance. Coming to sociology from extensive studies in jurisprudence and ethnology, he was inclined, from the very beginning of his writing, to over-emphasize the place of the group, especially the ethnic group, an inclination which was intensified in later years. The group is the one indispensable element of society. The individual, the state, all possible psychological or objective characteristics—these dwindle into insignificance before the group as the one element *par excellence* of all social life.

We might sum up the stages of social evolution which Gumplowicz distinguished in some such way as follows:

(1) "In the beginning" there were groups, not one group, but many, sprung from polygenetic origins.

(2) As soon as these groups became conscious of their needs, and found that they lacked anything, they began to contend with their more fortunate neighbors who had the goods they desired.

(3) This contest resulted in the elimination, annihilation or absorption of the weaker by the stronger group.

(4) By continuing this process of struggle for ages, the social group gained such solidity and such unity, that it removed the individual and made of him a mere grain of sand in the

¹ Stein calls the idea of the social group a metaphor.

aggregate pile, a mere member of the group. He came to have no mind, no will, no thought, except as the social group gave it to him.

(5) Society thus became a nexus of social groups, and the group, still continuing its struggle with other groups, is to-day the one simple and principal element of all social life. From the primitive horde to the modern state, the group struggle is essentially the same.

A large group may be composed of many smaller ones, each struggling with the other. "A state is therefore the organized control of the minority over the majority."¹ "It is a peculiarity of the social struggle," says Gumplowicz, "that it must be conducted by a collective whole. Every society must secure some suitable organ for conducting the social struggle."² This collective whole is the group, bound together by common interests. The more common the interests, the more united the group and the more powerful it becomes."³ The most harmonious group is the primitive one, where equality actually prevails,⁴ but as men's desires and wants cause them to raise themselves to a more civilized condition, and as the number of members in the group increases, it loses its solidity, and becomes proportionately less powerful. "The number of common interests varies inversely with the number of individuals in the social group."⁵ "The power of a social group increases with the number of common interests among its members, irrespective of size."⁶ While these two laws may seem contradictory, if stated *a priori*, when considered historically in relation to any group, they may be definitely proven, Gumplowicz asserts.

The state of today is therefore no divinely installed and ready-made institution, no artificial contractual organization, but a logically and lawfully evolved social phenomenon, following the same general laws as the simple polygenetic horde. It is a union of unequal groups, a sort of armed neutrality. Primitive equality has given way to the greatest inequality by means of

¹ Outlines, 118.

² *Ibid.*, 145.

³ *Ibid.*, 143.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 124.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 144.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 143.

which the individual has asserted himself. Yet the state is a taskmaster, and those who are members of the state group must subject themselves to the mastery of the group. They could not do otherwise, if they would, and continue in the state. "The only choice for men here below is between the state with its necessary servitude and inequality—and anarchy."¹

Whether the extreme emphasis, which Gumpłowicz has placed upon the power of the group and the significance of group conflict, is to be accepted as a principle of sociology or not, one thing is certain: he has done more than almost any German writer to turn the attention of German sociologists away from metaphysical attempts to interpret society as the whole human family, and has directed their attention rather to an analysis of a part of this whole which might be studied intensively. This tendency is strongly marked in Gumpłowicz's pupil and colleague, Ratzenhofer. Taking up the principle of the social group unit as laid down by Gumpłowicz, Ratzenhofer seeks in his sociology to find out what in the group makes of it a distinct association; what elements may be discovered in the group which are capable of scientific analysis and synthesis; finally, what is the fundamental basis of Gumpłowicz's view that a group is a body of people bound together by one or more common interests.

In solving this problem, Ratzenhofer uses one key. It is the key of interests that unlocks the door of every treasure house of sociological lore. Back of all structural or even functional relations of society, there stand the interests of the individuals who compose the group, and these, when analysed in turn, will explain all structure and function. "Nothing can be apprehended, nothing thought which does not lie in the attached interest."² Social life is a huge mass or bundle of interests, and society is formed through the constant conflict, adaptation, and reciprocal interplay of the interests of individuals. "The utilization of the law of interest in the judgment of social phenomena, and the observation of interest-development and activity in social life are the scientific methods of sociology."³

¹ Outlines, 180.

² Die soziologische Erkenntnis, p. 34.

³ Kritik des Intellekts, p. 151.

What, then, is interest, according to Ratzenhofer? To rightly understand what this author means by interest, one must appreciate Ratzenhofer's monism. He holds that from the original power which he designates "*Die Urkraft*," emanated the inherent or inborn (*angeborene*) interest of man, and by means of the physiological consciousness organ of man, the intellect, its subsequent development, and the whole range of other interests of men were evolved. "The original power in motion and its attached interests, standing in reciprocal relation to it and to each other, have produced the entire differentiation process of creation."¹ It must be noted here that Ratzenhofer makes of interest primarily a physiological manifestation, and relates all interests of men to their one inherent interest. The various specialized interests which Ratzenhofer names do not of themselves distinguish men from each other or give to them their elements and ideas of likeness and unlikeness. The inherent interest of men does this. It is the "inner conception of the impulse granted morphologically to the individual through his characteristics." In other words, this inborn interest is the ruling and dominating idea of the individual. It is this interest, for instance, which distinguishes and differentiates a dog from a wolf. It is this same interest which is at the basis of all human social relations.²

Before we analyze or break up Ratzenhofer's idea of inherent interest into its constituent parts, we must define his notion of interests in general, other than the inborn interest. Back of interest, for Ratzenhofer, stands necessity. An interest is nothing else than the formulation of a necessity. "Necessity expressing itself to our consciousness" is the way Ratzenhofer puts it.³ Three particular characteristics of these necessities are to be noted. In the first place, our necessities are nothing more nor less than demands of a physiological process working in us, and these needs are, therefore, subjected to natural law. In the second place, "our needs are not an arbitrary thought tendency

¹ *Die sociologische Erkenntniss*, p. 28; cf. pp. 31, 33, 56, 206, 225 and "*Soziologie*," p. 78 sq.

² Cf. "*Soziologie*," 78 sq.

³ *Die sociologische Erkenntniss*, p. 252.

of the subjective consciousness, but are produced, on the one hand, by the natural evolution of individuality, and, on the other, through the pressure of external circumstances." And again, our necessities root chiefly in the material nature of the ego, and gain a real intellectual content only by their relation to external circumstances.

It is necessity, thus characterized, which Ratzenhofer makes the basis of his definition of interest.

According to this definition, therefore, there can be no such thing as abstract interest. Every interest finds its root in a necessity, which in turn is grounded in the physiological nature of man, influenced by his own consciousness and external nature. And when we recall that Ratzenhofer, in true monistic fashion, makes of consciousness but an emanation from the Original Power, based upon the inherent interest, we may define all interest as necessary demands upon our nature for a need which is part of ourselves and part of the world about us. Or, otherwise expressed, interest may be designated as the formulation of a need.¹

We shall now attempt to show how Ratzenhofer has divided the content of his idea of inherent interest so that it may embrace all social relations of men. The inborn interest, which is inherent in the first germinal processes of reproduction, may be divided into five specialized interests, which in turn are capable of more extended subdivisions.² These five specialized interests, it must be remembered, are each and all emanations from the one inherent interest, and find their most complete interpretation always through the inborn interest.

(a) The first interest which proceeds from the inherent interest is that of sex, or the reproduction interest (*Gattungsinteresse*). It is the call of man to reproduce himself and to satisfy the craving of his sexual nature.

(b) The physiological interest may be better expressed as the

Cf. Small's definition of interest is his "General Sociology." p. 433. Small's entire interpretation of Ratzenhofer omits the relation of interests in general to the one inherent interest, a point most vital in Ratzenhofer's Sociology.

² *Cf.* Small, General Sociology.

interest in living, or self-preservation, and finds its external manifestation in the struggle for existence. The sex interest is necessarily fulfilled in the physiological interest.

(c) The physiological interest evolves into an individual interest. The more the physiological interest develops, the more does the individual interest come into prominence, "so that it seems as though the creature had no other interest than that of his own preservation and evolution." All individual physical and mental characteristics find their expression in the demands of the individual interest.

(d) Evolving principally from the sex interest, comes the social interest, which in turn is moulded and developed by conflict with the individual interest. "As soon as the individual interest arises, the social interest at once also differentiates itself, for each individuality, be it a germ in the organism or a community, has its special social interest."¹ This simultaneous birth of the two interests gives rise to a conflict which goes on unceasingly. On the one side, the individual interest demands selfish rights and self-preservation, regardless of other lives; on the other hand, the social interest strives for the welfare of the group in which the individual finds himself, whether it be family, horde, stock, race or state.

(e) In this struggle between the individual and the social, Ratzenhofer thinks the higher interests tend to predominate and out of the struggle then develops the transcendental interest. This interest belongs naturally and primarily to the individual, but soon becomes a social possession. It is the demand to understand the relations of the individual to the All and to the future which creates the transcendental interest.²

While Ratzenhofer lays special emphasis on the one inherent interest as the basis of all others, he could hardly be said to hold literally that each of the five special interests we have named may be traced in every individual or group, even in the most primitive. What Ratzenhofer would hold, however, would be that in all men, even the most primitive, there are latent in the

¹ Die sociologische Erkenntniss, 222.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 56-66; cf., p. 213 sq. and p. 244 sq.

inherent interest, with which each is endowed, the germs of all of the various other interests that produce social life. The task of social evolution has been, therefore, and is still, to bring to life the possibilities for higher attainments of interest which are dormant in every individual and group. The evolution of man from one of a horde, interested only in matters of sex and self-preservation, to a member of a national group, with relations of responsibility to others and with interests even beyond his own life—this is the social evolution *par excellence*, to trace which is in part the task of sociology.

The difference between Ratzenhofer's books, "Die Sociologische Erkenntniss" and "Soziologie" is mainly to be found in the fact that the idea of interests is not so prominent in the latter as in the former. Probably, if Ratzenhofer himself had lived to finish his last book, he would have coupled the two works together more closely. As they are now, they lack in many places the connecting link of interests which should make of Ratzenhofer's sociology a complete and perfect chain, beginning with his "Wesen und Zweck der Politik" (1893) and ending with his "Soziologie." By supplying the idea of interest to this latter work, however, where it is lacking, and by taking Ratzenhofer's sociology, as a whole, we may characterize it briefly as an analysis of the varied interests that go to make up the social life and society of human beings. Perhaps the most vital fault in his entire system is not his general method nor his fundamental idea, but the fact that he has relied too largely for his data upon ethnological and other sources dealing with primitive men. Coupled with this, is the fault, that he has depended not a little upon analysis of his own subjective consciousness for the basis of his theory. While there is no reason why any scientific investigator of society should not avail himself of these two valuable sources of information, they certainly do not contain the entire content of social relations, and whoever seeks to draw his data from them alone will necessarily find his field circumscribed very narrowly. Small has attempted to fill out the content of Ratzenhofer's idea of interests, their inter-play and development.

The idea of form, whether applied to a material object or to

a social group or society, immediately suggests to our minds structure or mould. The phrase, "social form" is used by a large number of sociologists and writers on social topics to designate simply structure of society. With Georg Simmel, however, social form is a quite different concept. For him "form", as applied to a social group, is neither structural nor moulding in its essential characteristic. He has given to the whole conception of social form a connotation, which is fast gaining adherence in Germany. And it is this peculiar emphasis on, and designation of form as applied to social groups, which distinguishes Simmel from almost every other German sociologist. In a former chapter we showed how Simmel limited the scope of sociology to the study of social forms, and we emphasized the fact that these forms were psychological. We shall now attempt to distinguish more fully what Simmel means by form and give a few examples of forms and this author's method of analyzing them.

Simmel seems to have derived his idea of social form from his studies in ethics, for in his "*Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft*" he gives to the idea of duty, for instance, a meaning and significance very similar to that developed later in his "*Soziologie*." The subjective character of motives, for example, does not in any sense determine their moral character. This, by itself, is only a form, from which no content can be deduced. This same form or subjective character may contain the most varied content. Duty, thus, is only a way of thinking of the future or the subjunctive. It is a form which can be applied to all sorts of matter, and which in turn can be separated from all matter. Duty is only a name for certain psychological characters of our representations. Thus, all moral principles are but analytic formulæ of a given reality. It is history which undertakes to fill the empty forms. History may fill this form of duty with one content in Rome in the Augustan Age, and with an entirely different one in New York in the nineteenth or twentieth century. Duty is one thing for the soldier and another for the mediaeval saint.

This short sketch of Simmel's consideration of morals as forms of subjective consciousness which can be considered apart from their content, will doubtless help us to understand more

clearly what he means by social form as distinct from social content.

There are in all social groups certain phenomena, which may be distinguished as common. Some of them are perfectly patent; others are very difficult to discover. These common social traits may be classed as subjective and objective. Under the latter class we may include such things as property, physical characteristics of the members of the group, the actions of the group viewed historically, and others of a similar character. Under the former class, the subjective, we include those traits of the social group which are manifest, in spite of the objective relations of the society. Some of these characteristics which Simmel treats are, conflict, enmity and harmony, superiority and subordination, freedom and constraint, secrecy, and poverty. These are what Simmel calls social forms, and the analysis and discovery of these and similar forms is for him the peculiar domain of sociology.

In Chapter V of his "*Soziologie*," Simmel considers the subject "*Secrecy and the Secret Society*"¹ This form, though essentially individual, has a peculiar importance when applied to the group. By means of the development of secrecy, associations of a most dissimilar character tend to follow a similar line of evolution. The form remains the same while the content varies. The form is identical whether viewed in an Indian council, a family group, a Scotch clan or an American labor union. The form, secrecy, does not change, although the people who associate in the secret organization be totally different. Secrecy is a reciprocal bond of union among men. In the instructive chapter, which Simmel has given us on this subject, he has shown the way for similar analysis of all sorts of social groups, and has suggested many problems, which he has not attempted to solve. His chapter on "*Die Selbsterhaltung der Gruppe*"² follows, in general, the same method. In this chapter Simmel shows that the social group will persist as long as there is a possibility of differentiation, due to the subjective differences of the members of the group. Thus, enmity and strife are among the most

¹ Pp. 337-402; cf. article on same subject in *Am. Jour. Soc.*, 1906, p. 441.

² *Soziologie*, 494-603. Cf. article in *Am. Jour. Soc.* on "*The Persistence of the Social Group*," March, 1898.

powerful allies of socialization and are forms which may be found in groups of a most diverse character. This social form tends to unity and social solidarity, when directed against foreign groups, and so it tends toward the self-preservation of the society when it finds its expression within the group.¹ Its effect on the group is the same, whether in the tribal state or in a "middle class" of a great nation.

We have emphasized the "form" feature of Simmel's sociology, perhaps to the neglect of what may appear to some to be his greatest sociological contribution, his careful and exhaustive group analyses. While we agree that Simmel's actual analysis of social groups are in and by themselves invaluable studies for the sociologist, we emphasize this fact, that the subjects and the method of these analyses, are much more vital than the studies themselves. And, since Simmel's whole method rests upon his conception of social form, we feel justified in pronouncing this emphasis his most peculiar trait. One important task of the sociologist will be to extend the number of these forms until it embraces all possible ones that affect social relations. Such forms as hunger, love, hate, labor, emotion, craft or skill, and hundreds of others, are all forms which can and should be studied by the sociologist. Whether all sociologists will agree to Simmel's nomenclature is quite apart from the question. The vital thing is that he has shown us a really helpful set of sociological problems, which should be studied.

Most people have been accustomed for years to class Albert Schaeffle either as an "organicist" or a "biological sociologist," and in doing so have lost sight of some of this author's fundamental characteristics. True, Schaeffle has no single trait which distinguishes him as readily as do the characteristics of the three authors just mentioned. He has, however, given us some peculiar ideas, for which his sociology will be more famous, when the stigma of its biological origin shall have vanished.

While Gumplowicz and Simmel proceed in their analysis from the small social group, Schaeffle starts with the larger state or national group. Unlike Spencer, his contemporary in the

¹ Cf. chapter on "Der Streit," pp. 247-336.

sociological field, Schaeffle rejected the individual, or the family, as the starting point of social organization, and began with the state, or the highest unity, working back to the individual. This emphasis on the state as the great social unit was natural with Schaeffle, in view of his long connection with the government. With this stress upon the importance of the state, went an emphasis upon another point, the property of the individual members of the state and of the state itself.

These two characteristics are peculiar to the sociology of Schaeffle, and distinguish him from his German colleagues. What, then, does he mean by the state, and what by property? These two elements, if we may so designate them, form at once the subjective and objective side of society.

The state is a psychological union of human wills for a common end. But the state can have no existence whatever unless it has a territorial expansion, or unless it possess property.¹ This close relation of the state considered psychologically, with all of the objective goods that go to make up the life of a people, has given opportunity for the critics of Schaeffle to say that he was making of sociology an "all-world" science, embracing in its sway everything that touched the life of man.² When it is recalled that Schaeffle would make of sociology a philosophy, in the broadest sense, of all the social sciences, the above criticism hardly points to an inconsistency, if indeed to an error.

Schaeffle has attempted to work out very few general laws of sociology. He has, however, pointed to some of the most significant social phenomena, and has emphasized a side of society to which attention must ever be directed, namely, the state and what are its relations to the individual and to his property and other objective goods.

The sociology of Ludwig Stein has for its basis one fundamental principle, the inherent sociability of man. This bond draws men together in the primitive horde. It holds them together in the national empire. It is strange that Stein has not developed this fruitful thought more in detail.³ The principle of

¹ Abriss, 83 sq.

² Cf. Barth, "Die Soziologie Albert Schaeffles," Vierteljahrsch f. wiss Phil und Soc., Dec., 1907.

³ Die Sociale Frage, p. 511 sq.

the inherent sociability of man, however, may be said to be a characteristic of Stein's sociology, since it is found to be the foundation of his thinking, whether he actually expresses it thus or not. Stein's "historical method", as he calls it, by which he makes of sociology a sort of statistical analysis of history, seems to find its warrant in this principle of sociability. By positing some universal sociological fundamental of this sort, Stein is able to find a basis for comparison and criticism of all other existing social theories, and also to construct for himself a series of "rules" which govern society.

By sociability he means that quality or element in man which leads him away from his own individuality and drives him to the social. Ratzenhofer has expressed the idea more clearly in his "social interest." It is the contrast between selfishness and altruism, between anarchy and social law, between individualism and socialism. While fundamental to all social life, Stein, in quoting the words of Goethe seems to despair of ever giving an adequate analyses of this part. He says, with the poet:

"Da steh' ich nun, ich armer Thor,
Und bin so klug als wie zuvor."

We have already distinguished the peculiar view of F. Tönnies, when we discussed his conception of community and society. It will be unnecessary to further characterize him here. The same holds true of Paul Barth. The latter's idea of the relation of sociology to the philosophy of history, as above explained, has distinguished him essentially from other German sociologists.

These various characteristics of the men we have chosen to discuss may be extended. We have, however, given in each case what we consider the most distinguishing mark of the different writers, with the hope that the reader may thus more easily be able to hold in mind the principles which German sociology has established.

CHAPTER V

Factors in the Social Process

OUR interpretation of German sociology would be incomplete if we neglected to give some of the principal factors, which the authors we are studying place in the foreground of the social process.

We have, therefore, chosen a limited number of factors, about which each one of our authors gives some discussion, and these we shall treat in the ensuing chapter. The four factors selected can be conveniently grouped in two pairs, thus: differentiation and integration, and individuation and socialization. Although other factors of the social process might be mentioned readily, these four are treated among the Germans more generally than any others. They will accordingly serve our purpose of fairly portraying the fundamental tenets of German sociology.

These four factors will be considered under each of the following authors, and in the order mentioned: Ratzenhofer, Simmel, Gumplowicz and Schaeffle, with some mention of Barth and Stein. In this treatment, we shall not repeat when one author holds the same views as the preceding one. Our main attempt will be to present the new contributions each has given on these particular topics.

Ratzenhofer is considered first in this series, because he has more fully developed the topics we are discussing than any other writer of the above-named group. In his various writings Ratzenhofer has laid little stress upon the process of integration, as such. He has been content to take this factor of social evolution for granted and has devoted most of his attention to the opposite principle, that of differentiation.

We may ask then, at the outset, what does Ratzenhofer mean by social differentiation? In answering this question, we must recall first of all the fact that Ratzenhofer is a monist of the

most pronounced type and that all of his social philosophy is deeply monistic. With this fact in mind, we may answer that social differentiation, like all other differentiation, whether physical or biological, is, in its simplest instance, nothing but a variation from the one primitive original force or power. "All life springs from the unsearchable primitive force."¹ With this start, the rest of the differentiation process is comparatively simple. If one postulates in the first place a single world-filling force, then the process of differentiation can readily be traced back to its primary source, and the fundamental of all social evolution be found. This is precisely what Ratzenhofer has done for us. Let us note the steps by which man and human society have differentiated from this primitive force.

The first step was the differentiation of man from the lower animals. This differentiation was the direct result of certain innate capabilities, which developed later into the inherent interest. The process of the differentiation of this one innate interest in man must have taken ages, but finally man was produced by natural and lawful means, a being distinguished from all other animal creation by the fact of his inherent interest. It should be noted here that Ratzenhofer connects human life inseparably with all other organic life, and, more than this, that he has made of the inherent interest of man, from which social life comes, a plain morphological and physiological fact. The differentiation of man from the lower animals happens in the field of those interests, which are most closely related to the physiological, such as the sex interest, the desire for sustenance, self-preservation, and so on.

"The first sure concept which we have of the nature of our being is interest, and this is the guiding principle of the biological as well as the social process."² The further variation of interests in men is now brought about by man's contact with his physical environment. As the life conditions of men are changed, by natural pressure or the driving of interest, new interests are produced and differentiation takes place. The differentiation leads men gradually to higher needs and other life-conditions,

¹ Die sociologische Erkenntniss, 222.

² *Ibid.*, 225.

which in turn brings them to new interests. Thus, the horde with its unsettled life changes into the settled tribe or the peaceful community, because of a variation in interests. In a word, the whole process of differentiation is one of constant adaptation of interests to new life conditions. With every change of the latter there comes a corresponding change in the former. Along with this differentiating process goes a parallel one, that of integration. The latter works for social stability; the former brings about social change.

In the factors of individuation and socialization, or the individual and his group, we may note that the individual according to Ratzenhofer is a two-fold product. He is at once the fruit of his own inherent interest capacity, and of his acquired characteristics, due to the pressure exerted upon him by his environment. This environment is also of two kinds. The individual finds it first of all in the group or groups in which he lives, in association and reciprocal inter-relation with other human beings. In the second place, this environment consists of all the physical and natural surroundings with which the individual is thrown in contact.

In his struggle with the former of these two kinds of environmental influences, the individual develops his noblest and most altruistic interests. The struggle with the latter set of influences, produces the more material interests of life. Thus, for instance, we note how the family trains the individual for all the finer social interests which he is called upon to use. The state gives him a political interest, the church, a confessional interest. The land, economic opportunity, trade and other physical factors develop chiefly those interests which help to better the individual's own condition.

Within the individual, and springing from his inherent interest, are his social and individual interests. These are born simultaneously with the individual. They are constantly at conflict with each other. Now the individual interest gains the upper hand, now the social. This conflict between individuation and socialization, however, leads to more developed individuality and to higher social life. Ratzenhofer holds that the group or the socializing tendency gains the ascendancy, for the individual will becomes subjected to the social will, and individuality can

find expression only when it would free itself from all social interest. Thus socialization is the more powerful of the two factors. The individual, though limited and constrained by social pressure, is not a mere lump of putty in the hands of the social group. He can influence his society and is in turn influenced by it. The fact that both the individual and the group find their origin in one common source, the inherent interest, seems to give to Ratzenhofer's view a mollifying of the status of the individual, which is not found in many other monistic theories, such as those of Gumplowicz or Stammer.

Unlike Ratzenhofer, Simmel has given us no carefully developed system of sociology. In fact, his entire view of what constitutes sociology would be opposed to a "system," as it is ordinarily conceived. Still he has developed in his various works certain principles and factors of the social process, among which may be included those under discussion in this chapter.

Simmel's idea of social differentiation found expression in his "Ueber sociale Differenzierung," which was among the first of his sociological writings.¹ Inasmuch as he has not varied his opinion on this subject to any extent in his later writings, we may use this early work as the basis for our consideration of his theory of social differentiation and integration.

For Simmel, social differentiation as exhibited in the realm of human social activity does not constitute a sufficiently definite process to be called a law, as Spencer and Ratzenhofer class it. His reason for this seems to be that differentiation exhibits a secondary process in social life and does not enter into the play of primary forces that form human society. It is, therefore, not a law, "but only the expression (Ausdruck) for a phenomenon which proceeds from the effect of real elementary forces."² On the other hand, ignoring this verbal quibble, Simmel seems to treat the whole process of social differentiation as one of the most fundamental and vital factors of all human life."³

¹ This book appeared for the first time in Schmoller's *Staats und Socialwissenschaftlichen Forschungen* in 1890.

² *Op. cit.*, 9.

³ Cf. this discussion of law with Chapter II of Simmel's "Die Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie," where he argues against the existence of historical laws.

Differentiation in social as well as in physical or biological life is an effect of an effort for the conservation of energy. For example, we have a process of differentiation going on within a certain group by means of which certain members of this group are separated and form a new set of relations, based upon some other social form, such as, say, secrecy. The differentiation finds its expression in this practical effort of the new group to conserve and add to the vitality and energies of its parent group. As long as the original group retained a collective responsibility, and as long as every member of the original group remained identified closely with every other member and with the whole group, there could be little differentiation, and the energies of the group must be concentrated to maintain its solidarity. As soon, however, as certain members of the group begin to express their individuality, for instance, a differentiation must occur. Thus the necessity for compactness and cohesion of a group is, on the one hand, the strongest and most original occasion for integration, and, on the other, a most powerful hindrance to differentiation.

Differentiation of a group takes place in two ways, first by the differentiating of the individuals within the group, and second, by the attachment of the group to a larger circle. We have considered the first instance in the illustration given above. The second occurs when by conquest or by invitation the original group is extended to include others. Or, it may be that the individual deliberately crosses the limits of his own social circle and annexes new areas to his social domain. This has the double effect of differentiating both the individual and the group.

The process of differentiation and integration of social groups are closely co-ordinated and alternate in many cases. Thus, for instance, the tendency in long differentiated groups is to revert to collective responsibility, when men try to throw the blame for individual faults on the state, or city or group. This tendency leads to integration, and appears to Simmel to be a dangerous one, inasmuch as it destroys the fluid state of the group, and drives it to rigid limits and canons. The best example of the tendency is seen in ecclesiastical groups. But this state of solidification cannot long continue in any group and it is often

followed by violent reactions, as in the case of religious or political upheavals. On the whole, Simmel justifies and proves repeatedly Spencer's dictum that differentiation and integration are in direct proportion to each other. So, while Ratzenhofer gives us the theoretical basis for the factors of differentiation and integration, Simmel, with characteristic detail, analyzes the process as exhibited in actual life.

In the discussion on the relation of the individual to the group, Simmel departs somewhat from his inductive and analytical treatment, and reverts, in part, to his master, Kant, and partly to the folk-psychology developed in the early sixties by Lazarus and Steinhal. According to Simmel, the individual is the point of intersection of social threads. He is the meeting place of all of the social influences with which he is thrown in contact. Thus, the more social the groups to which the individual is allied, the greater are his possibilities of individualization.¹

As long as the group, in which the individual finds himself, remains compact and feels its own collective responsibility, he has little chance to increase his individualizing powers. But as soon as the group is extended, the possibilities for individual expansion are multiplied. It is by this fact that the difference between a bigoted, narrow-minded provincial and a metropolitan "man of the world" is explained. The individual in the compact group, whose social life is found in a very limited circle, and in whom comparatively few social threads meet, finds little or no incentive to assert his own personality. He is equal to all his fellows in privilege and rank, and, therefore, is satisfied to stay in his present status. The individual, on the other hand, who is thrown at the crossing of many social threads sees all about him differences in rank and status. He is accordingly moved to better his personality, and increases his individual capacity. In the chapter on the "Social Level," in "*Ueber sociale Differenzierung*," Simmel declares that the psychological basis of all struggle for equality, the socialistic included, is endeavor after a higher status, and not for actual equality. He shows how, in almost every such struggle of which we know, the

¹ Cf. "*Soziologie*," p. 421 sq. for extended discussion on this point.

fight is waged against the class immediately above, and not against the highest. This socializing motive, therefore, contains a powerful individualizing element.

While the individual, according to Simmel, is the product almost exclusively of his social *milieu*, he himself it is who moulds and makes the society which in its turn reacts upon him. Contrary to Stammler's idea that society is "an externally regulated co-existence of human beings,"¹ Simmel holds that external regulation is secondary. The *sine qua non* of all socialization is the reciprocal inter-relation of the individuals who compose the several social groups. Without this reciprocity society could not exist, and by means of it alone can the true relation of the individual to his group be explained. Individual and society are not conflicting concepts, therefore; they are complementary one to the other, and neither one can exist without the other.

Quite different is the conception of the relation of the individual to society which Gumplowicz advances. To him the individual is merely a puppet manipulated by his group or groups. He has no mind, he has no will, he has no thought of his own. Even his physical characteristics, such as his features, are given to him by his group. He cannot act, except as his group directs. He is wholly and absolutely under the sway of the group. In point of reality, the individual does not exist for Gumplowicz. He is *nil*.

On the other hand, the group is the moving factor in civilization and social evolution. The socializing tendency of the group is to maintain its relentless rule over the individual, to bind him more closely than ever to itself. If socialization occurs outside of the group, it is due to conflict of groups, a struggle in which the individual merely does the bidding of his master, the group.

When Ratzenhofer attempted to carry out Gumplowicz's program of sociology, he realized that the extreme position of his colleague was too harsh, and was not true to the facts. Consequently, though still holding the same monistic philosophy as Gumplowicz, Ratzenhofer made of his individual more than an automaton and gave to the tyrant group some strict constitutional limitations.

¹ "Wirtschaft und Recht," p. 90.

Gumplowicz has not treated in any of his works the principles of differentiation and integration. In the ten universal laws which he posits as the basis of sociology, he does not mention either of these factors, although he implied them in several of the laws. Hemmed in by his narrow conception of society and sociology, Gumplowicz has found little place for these principles. Most of his writings, moreover, have been written for the practical purpose of serving as guides to statesmen and jurists, which may account in part also for a lack of discussion of these important factors.

That Gumplowicz did not, however, ignore the importance of differentiation and integration is seen in his "*Der Rassenkampf*" and later in his "*Outlines*." The emphasis on the fact of conflict of social groups, and the value of this conflict is equal to a discussion of the two factors just mentioned. Conflict between ethnic groups formed civil society, and further conflict has developed the state. And the continuance of conflict day by day serves as the greatest benefit to society. Thus conflict serves as the great differentiating force, which changes groups from one status to another. Whenever there is absence of conflict, there is a tendency to stagnate.

Integration is then a two-fold process. It is, on the one hand, the working of the group to hold its members in such a compact mass that the group always acts as a unit; the individuals never act. On the other hand, integration is seen in the solidification of two or more groups as a result of conflict, the welding and fusing of foreign elements into one homogeneous group.

The distinctive contribution which Schaeffle has made to the general discussion of differentiation and integration in German sociology, is that he has emphasized the stages of social evolution and has given to the factors of differentiation and integration their place in the whole social process.

Schaeffle's well-known demarcation of social development should be mentioned here. The first stage was the animal. After ages, man was finally differentiated from the remaining organic world, and entered upon his second stage, the horde. The other five steps Schaeffle has given as follows: (1) the stock-

founded people, up to the patriarchal order; (2) the settled or feudal society; (3) the burgher or city-state society; (4) society holding a common land or the age of territorial expansion; (5) the national and international community of modern society.

The differentiation of each one of these stages into the one next above it was brought about largely by the influence of environment, chiefly the physical *milieu*. Inasmuch as Schaeffle's view on this question coincides so closely with that of Ratzenhofer, already given, we shall not go into further detail at this point.

Schaeffle's attitude on the question of individuation and socialization deserves mention. In his earlier books and in his latest one, Schaeffle emphasizes the fact, as does Simmel, that individual and society are perfectly harmonious concepts. Perhaps he errs a little, even in his latest work, in not noticing the fact that, while individuation and socialization are mutually complementary one to the other, there may exist a conflict between these two, as Ratzenhofer has so well shown.

Barth has added nothing to this discussion, except to make the position of history more prominent in the field of the social. His sketch of the social process does not, however, distinguish him materially from the others.

Stein, likewise, adds little to the topics under consideration. His "historical-method" has made his view simply a summary of the results of other men.

Further consideration of the factors of social evolution will, therefore, be omitted and summarizing the results of our interpretation of German sociology, we proceed to the question, how far the Germans have taken possession of the real sociological field.

CHAPTER VI.

Conclusions.

At the close of an interpretation of a national group of scientists, such as this study has attempted, one can hardly help asking the question, how well have these men understood the real task of their science, and how truly have they considered its problems. Manifestly, in a science so recent in its development as sociology has been, it would be impossible to answer in a decisive manner the question as to the proper solution of the sociological problems the Germans have undertaken to discuss. We have not yet gained that stage of exactness in any of our social sciences, where we may square our opinions up to certain universally accepted principles. It is indeed doubtful if we ever will arrive so far, owing to the character of the data under discussion. Certain general principles, or perhaps methods, are accepted with more or less variation, but dogmatic statements of doctrine are still frowned upon by most sociologists. True, certain men have advanced what they believe to be the entering wedge which will eventually split the seeming mysteries of social composition and social constitution, but none of these have received universal acceptance for their face value. We shall, therefore, not be accused of evading the question, if we do not answer dogmatically, for instance, what the German definitions of society or of sociology are lacking to make them complete and true. No one has yet successfully, and for all times and peoples, solved the riddle, "What is Society?" We shall not presume to do so in this chapter.

According to the program which we outlined in the introduction, we have not attempted to consider every German writer who has dealt with social or sociological problems.¹ We have tried to show the reader some of the principal problems discussed by the leading German sociologists, with the hope that

¹ Stein in his "Die sociale Frage" makes some such trial, and finds great difficulty in giving a limited survey in over 600 pages.

an adequate knowledge of some of the chief characteristics of the "German School," if we may so call it, might be gained. Let us note a few of these general characteristics which we can apply to all German Sociology.

As we stated before, we repeat again, that one of the principal distinguishing marks of German Sociology is its newness. The numerous attempts to adapt sociology to some of the other social sciences, the most recent works on this subject, and the lack of a deep, thorough consideration of the sociological field, bear witness to the newness of the science.

As a corollary of this trait may be noted the fact that German sociology has devoted most of its energies to the discussion of problems of method. A large part of Schaeffle's work, and strange to say, some of the most lasting parts, have been his contributions to methodological problems. Ratzenhofer's work, with the exception of his last book, are devoted mainly to problems of method and even where this idea is not prominent, the methodological ideas are always close in the background. Gumpłowicz, too, has gone little beyond the problem of definition. Where he is not defining the fundamentals of his theory, he really leaves the pure sociological field and enters the realm of ethnology, history or jurisprudence. Simmel may be said to have broken away more than any other German sociologist from these basic principles of definition. But even he has not gone far away and has limited his horizon, as we have shown, to a very narrow circumference. As for Barth, his entire work has been for the purpose of demonstrating his thesis, that sociology is equivalent to the philosophy of history. Stein and Tönnies have done little beyond defining the limits of their science. For the many others who have written on sociology in the last few years and who are now writing, the problems of method have occupied the foreground. A hopeful sign that discussion on such problems will give way to others of more importance was evidenced in the International Conference on Sociology, held in Berne, July, 1909, where many Germans participated in the general discussion on social solidarity.

A third general characteristic of German sociology is the close relation it maintains with the other social sciences, and coupled with this, the difficulty it has experienced in gaining an inde-

pendent standing. The jealousy with which the various self-constituted wardens of the special social sciences have guarded the portals of their various domains, has hindered the sociologist in numerous ways from making any degree of rapid progress. Perhaps, however, when all things are considered, sociology is at the present time gaining ground as rapidly as can be expected.

These few general characteristics of German sociology, while not sufficient to make of this national group a distinct "school," will serve to distinguish it from other groups of a similar nature. We shall now consider in order some of the topics discussed in the foregoing pages, for the purpose of systematizing them to a more compact whole.

In the definition of society, the Germans, like others, have gone to the two extremes of making it on the one hand co-extensive with humanity, and on the other hand of limiting it to the group or groups immediately under consideration. On the whole, definitions of society, like those of Schaeffle or Barth, which hold to a certain comprehensive unity, have had the greatest vogue in German thought. The German seems to be more ready to speculate about the great whole, than to reason about the smaller group. We may fairly ask, then, are these two ideas contradictory one to the other, and must society be considered as either one or the other?

Few words used in social science have had more varied connotations than the word "society." It has been applied to the animal herd and to the primitive human horde. It has been used for an empire and at the same time for a city. Humanity has been called "society" and in the same breath men have called a selected group of people in some corner of the globe by the same name. The word has been fitted to a number of people occupying a common territory and living on a limited area, and also to a band of people united by no territorial bond whatever. It is commonly used of a million or of a group of a half-dozen. Why this variety of uses? Does the word "society" mean nothing definite? Has the sociologist any right to apply to it one certain connotation and refuse to give credence to any other? There surely ought to be some discoverable mark of society.

Schaeffle finds this mark in its unity, a whole, which seems

to him to bear striking analogies to the human body. Lilienfeld sees in society a super-human personality, with all the physiological and mental traits of a human body. Barth recognizes society by its mental oneness, a unity which as in the case of Schaeffle, bears a strong organic likeness. Tönnies makes of society a two-fold union, composed of simple and complex, or instinctive and willed organic bodies. Do any of these connote all that society is?

In a certain sense, society is an indivisible unity, and if one cares to do so, he can find in this whole many analogies to the human body. But this does not make of society a great body, any more than the fact that a tree bears striking analogies to a blade of grass, makes them identical. Society can be considered as one, whether we make that one, humanity, as Barth would, or the state, as Schaeffle does. But the fact that it is one does not prevent it from being considered as many. In ecclesiastical circles, we may consider the Church as one, but there are still millions of individual churches and thousands of special denominations, each bearing the same name, "church." So, in the broadest sense society is one. What its bond of union is we shall consider later.

Thus, again, we may say with Simmel, or Gumpłowicz or Ratzenhofer, that society is "legion." From two or three persons, eating a common meal or taking a walk, to a mediaeval guild, or a modern labor union; from the savage horde without any headship, to the Holy Roman Empire, or the United States; from a marauding band of traders and free booters to a modern trust the process of socialization is one and the same, and every stage in it may be called a society. We may ask then what it is that distinguishes a group of people whom one sees on the street, for instance, from a society, in the sociological sense of the term.

Simmel has stated that there must be more than spacial nearness of persons to make a society. A gathering of men and women, therefore, walking along the street, or riding on a trolley car could hardly be called a society, because the only tie which binds this group as such together is that of proximity. Accordingly, Simmel adds that the necessary presupposition for any society is a reciprocity of influences, a mutual interplay of psychological impulses and motives. Gumpłowicz has stated

the same thing more objectively, by saying that it is some real visible interest which must bind the group together. Ratzenhofer has added to this conception the psychological thread which again relates it to Simmel, by showing that there must be an interaction of interests to hold the group together.

The sole mark of society, then, as distinguished from what, in Lilienfeld's terminology, we may call "discrete collectivities" is a certain psychological inter-relation of minds, which unites the group about one or more common interests. The society may be large or small, localized or scattered, it matters not. So long as it possesses these two characteristics, a reciprocal interaction of minds, and a uniting interest or corps of interests, the group loses its spacial limits and becomes a society in the real sense of the word.

That this definition of society, which includes a family reunion or an international congress, a horde or a great empire, a local group or humanity, is not inconsistent with the idea of society as a unity, is very evident. If the bond of union is a mental one, society may transcend spacial limitations and may embrace humanity as well as any other body. The only distinction is that humanity then becomes an extended group; the only presupposition necessary to call it society is to prove that it has the same common bond of union as any other group.

Perhaps for sake of clearness and definiteness, we should give names to the various societies which we include under humanity. The difficulty in doing this, however, is to find criteria of classification, which will be universally accepted by all sociologists. Giddings, in his "Descriptive and Historical Sociology"¹ has given one classification, but many others of a similar character might be made. One of the principal tasks of sociology should be to find out all of the available criteria for such classification, and then to decide on certain ones that are most useful for the scientist.

If we pause to test our definition of society, we shall notice two things, first, that the definition can be applied to all of the various designations and connotations of the term given above, and second, that German sociology has given very material aid in

¹ New York, 1906: pp. 10-62.

the solution of this question. One great lack of German sociology to-day is the failure to realize that the two conceptions of society held by most sociologists are fundamentally one, and that there should be no conflict between the holders of these two views.

The definition of sociology has given the Germans more difficulty than that of society. The contest as to whether sociology should be a general social philosophy or a special social science has been and is still being carried on with vigor. That here again, as in the case of society, there can be a reconciliation and a mutual adaptation of these two extreme views, seems to have been overlooked by the German sociologists.

The strictly social activities of men may be divided up into many individual fields. The study of man in his racial and ethnic development may be classed properly as ethnology. The study of man in his economic activities may be called economics. The simple relation of the successive events in man's life, whether economic, racial, civil, or political, belongs to the field of history. Man's political actions are considered by the sciences of law and jurisprudence, together with political economy. These several phases of man's social activities and many more, are susceptible of special and detailed study. The data, which may be collected under each sphere, is of such a nature that it can be viewed intensively and can be studied in isolation from other social facts.

We may ask the question, then, if there are not other realms of social life which none of these special sciences cover. Are there facts and laws, which should form part of human knowledge, but which, under the existing classification of the sciences, cannot be discovered? If so, then the classification of the sciences should be extended to include these facts. By this process of reasoning, both Simmel and Gumpłowicz came to the conclusion that sociology had a field separate and distinct from any other of the social sciences. Gumpłowicz saw that the group and group action were not considered by any science. Simmel realized that social form, as he conceived it, was entirely ignored. Each, therefore, declared that his own particular discovery should be considered as the one and only field of sociological research.

On the other side, such men as Schaeffle, Stein and Ratzenhofer realized that the special social sciences were suffering because of some bond by which they might be united into a harmonious whole, without, at the same time, losing their identity. The bond that was needed was none other than a social philosophy, which should partake of each of the special social sciences, but which should be distinct from all of them. Schaeffle saw this bond in the biological union of man and other organic life, and in the fact that, society being a unity, the whole was more important than its parts. Stein looked upon all the special social sciences as ruled and governed by a social philosophy which he called sociology. Ratzenhofer made each of the social sciences a handmaiden to sociology, but he gave them back in turn a philosophy by which they might make their thinking more harmonious. The center of this philosophy was interest.

Is sociology, then, limited, on the one hand, to a consideration of either group conflict, or social form, with no further end in view? Or, on the other hand, is it to be considered merely as a philosophy of the other social sciences, with some such central thought like interest as its welding influence? It seems to be certain that sociology has a wider horizon than the study of social form, unless indeed Simmel would be willing to extend the definition of his favorite term. Certainly Gumpłowicz is right in his contention that the group as a group and the conflicts of groups form a legitimate part of sociology. But, if we limited sociology to Gumpłowicz's idea, we would have to leave out Simmel's conception almost entirely. And, inasmuch as neither of these conceptions finds a place in the fields of other sciences, they should both be included in one science, sociology, or we should have to have two additional sciences. This difficulty is increased if we attempt to exclude all of the special social characteristics which other sociologists have discovered.

How far, though, shall the field of sociology be extended? At the present time, the various special scientists dealing with society in Germany are at variance. Each one sets up his own field as the one exclusive and only social science. The historian says there is no need for the other scientist. He can cover the whole field. The economist makes a similar boast, while even

biologists are to-day trying to extend that science to embrace all social life. There is need, then, for some philosophy, or some science (the name is not material) which shall harmonize these various fields and shall make all of the social sciences one. Just as in the great science of sickness, we have several sub-sciences, such as pathology, bacteriology, surgery, sanitation and many others, so might we not have a science of society, which should bring into harmony all of the various sciences dealing with man in his social relations? To continue the above analogy, the pathologist is not at war with the surgeon, but they are rather mutually helpful. The physician in his practice uses the results of all of the specialists, and thus attempts to add to the lore of his profession. Thus the sociologist should be able to give to the economist, ethnologist, biologist, psychologist or historian some central thought or thoughts which would make him a helper, and he should also be able to utilize the results of these various specialists in solving his own problems.

For the sociologist, like the physician, has problems of his own, which none of the other specialists can solve. Such problems are those we have mentioned, the study of social form, group action, imitation as a social force, social pressure and constraint, social stimulus, and hosts of others. These latter problems make sociology a special science, while the general problems above discussed make of it a philosophy. Thus, for instance, Ratzenhofer's philosophy of interest is helpful to every social scientist in whatever field he is acting. And on the other side, the knowledge gained from economics, for example, is indispensable to the understanding of certain social forms. In this manner, the definition of sociology given by the various German sociologists may be harmonized and the hostility between the two camps can be neutralized.

We are now in position to ask a final question, namely, what does German sociology lack? And we answer, first of all, as we have shown in this chapter, it lacks harmony. Perhaps the German society of sociologists, recently formed, will help to bring about harmony, but a clear conception of what sociology is or can become will do more than anything else in this direction. There is, however, no generally recognized leader of sociology in

Germany, and this may help on the disharmony. With a leader or leaders of the right kind, the men who are now entering the field will not be so liable to bring this science into disrepute with scientists in other fields. Still a most striking lack in German sociology is official recognition by all of the universities. In Germany proper, there are not more than five chairs in sociology, and in the other German-speaking countries, there are altogether not more than six.

But in spite of these handicaps, sociology is gaining ground among the Germans, and we predict its general recognition among all German scholars before many more years have passed.

APPENDIX—BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF GERMAN SOCIOLOGY

THE following is not intended for an exhaustive bibliography of German sociology. The aim of the writer has been to select from the large field covered in the foregoing pages the principal works of the leading writers on this topic. Accordingly, most of the men who have made any noteworthy contribution to German sociology are represented in this bibliography.

The arrangement of the authors is in alphabetical order. Under each author, however, has been placed not only his own works, but in some instances also criticism of his work by other men. For the most part, the books and articles of the various authors are arranged chronologically under their names. The name of the author is given first, followed by the title of the book or article, after which is placed the date or periodical and other information of interest to the student. In some cases a brief note about a book or article helps to explain the contents, but in most instances the German title is sufficient.

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Die Zeit, Wiener Wochenschrift für Politik, Volkswirtschaft, Wissenschaft und Kunst. Editor, J. Singer, Vienna, 1897 to date.

Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft im deutschen Reich. Editor, Gustav Schmoller, Leipzig, 1877 to date.

Monatschrift für Sociologie. Editors, Dr. Eleutheropulos and Baron von Engelhardt. Leipzig, January, 1909, to date. This is the only periodical devoted exclusively to sociology in Germany.

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VITA

PHILIP PETER JACOBS was born in Syracuse, N. Y., on March 28, 1879. He attended the public schools of Binghamton, N. Y., and later was graduated from the high school of that city in the year 1898. In the fall of that same year he entered Syracuse University, where he was graduated with Phi Beta Kappa honors in the year 1903. After graduation he spent two years in newspaper work in Binghamton, and in the fall of 1905 entered Drew Theological Seminary, at Madison, N. J. He graduated from this institution in 1908, receiving a fellowship for the year 1909 for study in Columbia University. During his course in the Seminary he attended lectures at Columbia University, fulfilling most of the residence requirements in this period. He also worked for the State Charities Aid Association of New York, publishing, under the direction of the Hospital Committee of that body, two reports in the years 1907 and 1908, entitled, respectively, "The Ambulance Service of Greater New York" and "New Hospitals Needed for Greater New York." On March 1, 1908, he became Assistant Secretary of the National Association for the Study and Prevention of Tuberculosis. In this capacity he compiled a volume of 376 pages, entitled "The Campaign Against Tuberculosis in the United States," published by the Russell Sage Foundation in 1908.

